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INTRODUCTION

In the fall of 2010, two major political battles over climate
change in the United States reached their climax. At the federal level,
efforts to enact comprehensive climate change legislation-already in
doubt after the Senate refused to consider legislation passed by the
House-were terminated for the near future by a landslide win for
conservative Republicans, who are overwhelmingly hostile to climate
change legislation, in midterm Congressional elections.' At the state
level, California voters considered Proposition 23, a ballot initiative
that would have effectively repealed the state's comprehensive global
warming statute (AB 32, enacted in 2006).2 Yet despite the fact that
the 2010 elections produced a wave of conservative Republican
victories across the United States, from the local to the federal level,
Proposition 23 lost handily, by over twenty points.
Why did Proposition 23 lose by such a large margin? An
obvious answer might simply be that California is unique in the
United States, politically, culturally, and economically, and therefore
is far more receptive to aggressive environmental legislation. But that
facile answer would, first of all, not be entirely correct 3 and, second of
all, would beg the questions: Why is California so different on
environmental issues? And might the reasons behind that difference
inform the development of climate change policy at the federal level?
1.

Phil Plait, Every Single Republican Senate Hopeful Is Against Climate Change Action,

DISCOVER MAG. (Sept. 29, 2010, 9:04 AM), http:/Iblogs.discovermagazine.comlbadastronomy/
(discussing
2010/09/29/every-single-republican-senate-hopeful-is-against-climate-change-action/
a survey showing that Republican candidates for the U.S. Senate in the 2010 elections
overwhelmingly rejected federal action on climate change).
2.
ETHAN ELKIND ET AL., CALIFORNIA AT THE CROSSROADS: PROPOSITION 23, AB 32, AND
CLIMATE CHANGE 1 (2010), available at http://www.law.berkeley.edulfiles/CLEE-California
_at theCrossroads.pdf.
3.
See infra notes 43-51 and accompanying text.
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As it turns out, California is different in significant part
because of history, specifically the long history of its aggressive efforts
to develop energy policy that increases efficiency and reduces
dependence on fossil fuels. Those policies have, over the years, created
an interest group landscape that is supportive of stricter efforts to
restrict carbon emissions and hostile to efforts to repeal energy
efficiency and renewable energy mandates-as shown by the details of
the campaign over Proposition 23.
The campaign over California's Proposition 23 shows that
history does make a difference in policy dynamics. That insightwhich builds on a significant political science literature emphasizing
history and path dependence in policy development 4-matters for the
debates over climate change policy. Many commentators on climate
change policy have focused more on the economics of climate change
than the politics. Even when they have looked at the politics, it has
been a "snapshot," static analysis of what efforts might be able to be
enacted now, rather than an analysis of how policy choices today
might make future efforts more feasible. While there are a few
scholars who have looked at the political dynamics of climate change
policy,5 the campaign over Proposition 23 provides a unique

For useful overviews of this literature, see, for example, Paul Pierson, The Study of
4.
Policy Development, 17 J. POL'Y HIST. 34 (2005); Paul Pierson, When Effect Becomes Cause:Policy
Feedback and Political Change, 45 WORLD POL. 595 (1993) (book review).
5.
On the importance of a dynamic political analysis in understanding how policy changes
occur and of understanding how policy changes shape the political environment, see ERIC M.
PATASHNIK, REFORMS AT RISK: WHAT HAPPENS AFTER MAJOR POLICY CHANGES ARE ENACTED 34, 9-11 (2008). For a similar discussion in the context of climate change policy, see Rachel
Brewster, Stepping Stone or Stumbling Block: Incrementalism and National Climate Change
Legislation, 28 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 245, 252-55 (2010) (noting the problems of static costbenefit analyses of climate change legislation that fail to consider whether such legislation will
inspire future actions that will be more effective); Brian J. Cook, Arenas of Power in Climate
Change Policymaking, 38 POL'Y STUD. J. 465, 468 (2010) (noting importance of understanding
politics dynamically in predicting feasibility of different climate change policy options). Some
literature has focused on the specific context in which industry, concerned about differential
state regulation in a national market, pushes for "defensive preemption" by the federal
government, and how this dynamic might advance climate change policy. E.g., J.R. DeShazo &
Jody Freeman, Timing and Form of Federal Regulation: The Case of Climate Change, 155 U. PA.
L. REV. 1499, 1504-16 (2007); see also sources cited infra note 146 (describing, for example,
efforts by impacted industries to lobby for national action in order to equalize the playing field).
For an early attempt to examine the role of policy dynamism in the development of
environmental law, see generally E. Donald Elliott et al., Toward a Theory of Statutory
Evolution: The Federalizationof Environmental Law, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 313, 314-17 (1985).
There have also been efforts to explore the role of policy and political dynamism in debates over
the proper roles of federal and state governments in environmental law. See, e.g., William W.
Buzbee, Contextual Environmental Federalism, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 108 (2005); Ann E.
Carlson, Iterative Federalismand Climate Change, 103 Nw. U. L. REV. 1097 (2009).
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opportunity to explore how those dynamics actually might play out in
practice, and to develop broader lessons for climate change policy.
The defeat of Proposition 23 teaches that, since history
matters, an important factor in considering climate change policy is
not just what is economically efficient, and not just what is politically
possible today, but also what policies will increase the odds of enacting
effective climate change policy in the future and decrease the
effectiveness of a future backlash undoing those effective policies.
Climate change policies that encourage significant investments by
regulated industry, that build up new industries that depend upon
climate change policy (and therefore will support the maintenance and
expansion of that policy), and that are perceived by voters as having
significant economic benefits will all be more effective. California's
energy policies from the 1970s on had all of these effects, and they
paid off in the campaign over Proposition 23.
The other lesson from the campaign over Proposition 23 is that
incrementalism can be a successful strategy for climate change policy 6 :
a comprehensive solution may only be achievable once intermediate
policy steps have cultivated a friendly political landscape by building
up supportive interest groups. Incrementalism has implications for a
range of debates in climate change policy and environmental law. It
shows the flaws in standard criticisms of interest group influence in
environmental policymaking, since efficient environmental regulation
may often be advanced by incremental compromises with important
special interest groups. It also provides an additional rationale for
allowing state-level experimentation in environmental law, since state
efforts like those in California can provide a seed from which interest
group support for efficient and desirable federal legislation can grow.
Of course, California's climate change legislation is truly only
one of many steps needed to reduce future climate change; federal
legislation and international steps are essential. Nonetheless,
proponents of climate change legislation at the federal level should
take note of the message from the defeat of Proposition 23: the most
important feature of any effort to address climate change may not be
whether or not it is the best policy vehicle in an ideal world, but
whether or not it will create political momentum for future steps in
the climate change arena.

6.
I use the term "incrementalism" here to not just refer to an overall regulatory or policy
approach that is phased in or tightened over time, but also to the use of what might be wholly
different or unrelated regulatory or policy approaches to create a supportive political landscape
for later regulatory or policy approaches.

2013]

LESSONS FOR CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY

403

Part I of this Article briefly describes the background of
Proposition 23, the campaign over the Proposition, and its electoral
defeat. It then explores various reasons for the defeat of Proposition
23, including how the history of California's environmental and energy
regulation helped lay the groundwork for the defeat of Proposition 23
by nurturing the creation of a vibrant renewable energy and energy
efficiency industry. Part II explores the implications of Proposition 23
for the scholarly climate change policy and environmental law
literature. Part III addresses possible problems with the strategic use
of interest groups to advance policy goals, specifically arguments that
such efforts might undermine democracy or lead to suboptimal policy
outcomes. Part IV compares the campaign over Proposition 23 with
the fight over federal climate legislation in 2009 and 2010 in order to
develop tentative proposals for improving the chances of successful
federal climate legislation
I. WHY PROPOsITION 23 LOST
A. The Background of Proposition23
In 2006, the California legislature passed AB 32, which
provided for an economy-wide regulatory system for carbon dioxide
emissions in the state. The statute delegates broad powers to the
California Air Resources Board to reduce greenhouse gas emissions to
1990 levels by 2020.7 AB 32 is part of a much larger state effort to
improve energy efficiency and reduce California's carbon dioxide
emissions, including limits on carbon emissions by automobiles and
other mobile sources in the state, requirements that land-use planning
take into account impacts on carbon emissions, and requirements that
appliances and building codes increase energy efficiency.8 AB 32 is the
most aggressive state-level effort in the United States to address
climate change.9
Proposition 23 as drafted would have "suspended" the
implementation of AB 32 until the statewide unemployment rate fell
to 5.5 percent for at least one full year.10 While the provision was
7.
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 38510, 38550 (West 2007).
8.
For an overview of California's energy efficiency and renewable energy legislation, see
infra Table 1.
9.
W. Michael Hanemann, How California Came to Pass AB 32, the Global Warming
Solutions Act of 2006, at 1 (Dep't of Agric. & Res. Econ. & Pol'y, Univ. of Cal. at Berkeley,
Working Paper No. 1040, 2007), available at http://escholarship.org/uc/item/1vb0j4d6.
10. ELKIND ET AL., supra note 2, at 1.
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billed as merely a temporary pause on climate change policy until the
state economy recovered, given historic employment data for
California it would have effectively repealed the statute: that level of
unemployment has been reached three times in California since
1976.11 During the campaign over Proposition 23, the statewide
unemployment rate was about twelve percent. 12
Proposition 23 qualified for the California statewide ballot in
November 2010 by receiving approximately eight hundred thousand
signatures from registered voters, almost twice the required number.13
The campaign for the Proposition was initially highly touted by the
press. 14 Contributions during the campaign were significant: a total of
over forty million dollars. 15 Valero and Tesoro, Texas-based oil
companies, provided the lion's share of the funding for the Yes side of
the campaign: ninety-three percent of the Yes campaign contributions
came from oil corporations, and Valero itself contributed over five
million dollars. 16 The opposition to the campaign received about
thirty-one million dollars, almost three times as much as the $10.5
million raised by the Yes campaign.17 Polling throughout the

11. Id.
12. See Margot Roosevelt, Proposition23 Poll Shows a Dead Heat Among California Voters,
L.A. TIMES, Sept. 24, 2010, http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/greenspace/2010/09/ proposition-23poll-global-warming-california.html (quoting employment data in September 2010).
13. Chris Rizo, Referendum on Calif. Greenhouse Law Appears Headed for Voters, LEGAL
NEWSLINE (May 3, 2010), http://www.legalnewsline.com/spotlight/226957-referendum-on-calif.greenhouse-law-appears-headed-for-voters.
14. See, e.g., Suzanne Goldenberg, Prop 23 Battle Heats Up in California as
Schwarzenegger Comes Out Fighting, GUARDIAN, Sept. 30, 2010, http://www.guardian.co.uk/
environment/2010/sep/30/prop-23-battle-heats-up (characterizing Proposition 23 as an attack
against Governor Schwarzenegger's "green legacy. . . [and] a landmark environmental law").
15. Disaggregate data can be found at the California secretary of state's campaign finance
reporting website. Cal. Sec'y of State, Campaign Finance: Proposition 023, CAL-ACCESS,
(last
http://cal-access.sos.ca.gov/Campaign/Measures/Detail.aspx?id=1324800&session=2009
visited Oct. 18, 2012); see also Margot Roosevelt, Proposition 23: Backers Were Outspent, OutOrganized, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 12, 2010, http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/greenspace/2010/11/
proposition-23-defeat-global-warming-climate-change-initiative.html (highlighting the funding
disparity between supporters and opponents of Proposition 23); CaliforniaProp. 23 - Campaign
Contributions - Nov. 2010, MAPLIGHT, http://maplight.org/content/california-prop-23-nov-2010
(last updated Nov. 4, 2010) (providing aggregate figures as well as more detailed data in
spreadsheet format).
16. ENVIRONMENT CALIFORNIA, ANNUAL REPORT: A RECAP OF OUR WORK FOR OUR
MEMBERS IN 2010, at 4 (2010), available at http://www.environmentcalifornia.org/sites/
environment/files/Environment-California2010-Annual-Report.pdf.
17. CaliforniaProp. 23- Campaign Contributions- Nov. 2010, supra note 15.
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campaign showed the race initially tight, but toward the end shifting
significantly against. 1
Following the trends of the polls during the campaign,
Proposition 23 lost by a substantial margin: 61.6 percent against to
38.4 percent for. 19 The defeat of Proposition 23 might have been
expected in a state that was strongly Democratic, 20 even in the 2010
elections. Regression analysis of voting patterns at the county level for
Proposition 23 does show that by far the strongest correlations with a
county's vote for Proposition 23 were the partisan affiliation of voters
in the district, as reflected by the vote in the 2010 gubernatorial
election; 21 the higher the vote for the Democratic candidate, the lower
the vote for Proposition 23.22

18. Compare Margot Roosevelt, Proposition23 Poll Shows a Dead Heat Among California
Voters, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 24, 2010, http://latimesblogs.latimes.comlgreenspace/2010/09/
proposition-23-poll-global-warming-california.html (showing polling data from September 2010
at forty percent in favor of Proposition 23 and thirty-eight percent opposed), with John Hoeffel &
Margot Roosevelt, California Voters Turning Against Prop. 19 and Prop. 23, Poll Shows, L.A.
TIMES, Oct. 21, 2010, http://articles.latimes.com/2010/oct/21/local/1a-me-1021-prop-poll-20101021
(showing polling data from October 2010 at forty-eight percent opposed and thirty-seven percent
in favor). Other polling data showed Proposition 23 running behind even earlier. See MARK
DICAMILLO & MERVIN FIELD, FIELD RESEARCH CORP., THE FIELD POLL, RELEASE No. 2342, at 1
(2010), available at http://www.field.com/ fieldpollonline/subscribers/Rls2342.pdf (finding fortyeight percent opposed and thirty-six percent in favor from a survey conducted between June 22
and July 5, 2010).
19. See infra Table 2 (providing details).
20. See DICAMILLO & FIELD, supra note 18, at 4-5 (showing Republicans supporting
Proposition 23 forty-seven percent to thirty-three percent, Democrats opposing fifty-seven
percent to thirty-one percent, and independents opposing fifty-three percent to twenty-nine
percent); Mining the Field Poll: Climate Change, Gov, Senate, CALBUZZ (July 12, 2010),
(analyzing
http://www.calbuzz.com/2010/07/mining-the-field-poll-climate-change-gov-and-senate/
July 2010 polling data showing support for Proposition 23 very high among voters supporting
Republican candidates and very low among voters supporting Democratic candidates).
21. See infra Table 4 (providing data).
22. Less important were economic and demographic factors: while higher unemployment
rates correlated with higher votes for Proposition 23, the relationship was not statistically
significant. Using alternative estimates of partisanship (proportion of the vote for the
Democratic candidate for U.S. President in 2008, or proportion of county voters registered as
Democrats) resulted in finding stronger relationships with economic or demographic variables.
Using the presidential vote as an independent variable led to a finding that both the average
income in a county as well as the proportion of the county population that is Hispanic had
statistically significant positive correlations with voting "Yes" on Proposition 23. Using
Democratic registration levels resulted in unemployment levels having a statistically significant
positive relationship with voting "Yes" on Proposition 23. This regression analysis must be taken
with a grain of salt: the analysis cannot provide full insights into individual voter
decisionmaking since we only have data aggregated at the county level. This is what political
scientists call the "ecological fallacy." See generally, e.g., Anthony S. Chen et al., Explaining the
ContemporaryAlignment of Race and Party: Evidence from California's 1946 Ballot Initiative on
Fair Employment, 22 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 204 (2008) (providing an overview of the problem and
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But the margin and distribution of the votes are nonetheless
surprising: Proposition 23 lost in some of the most Republican
counties of the state, some of which are as conservative as
Oklahoma. 23 Proposition 23 lost in counties with a plurality of
registered Republican voters, ranging from rural counties such as
Butte, 24 Calaveras, 25 El Dorado, 26 Nevada, 27 Placer, 28 and San Luis
Obispo, 29 to suburban counties such as Riverside, 30 and urban counties
such as San Diego.31 Proposition 23 lost by bigger margins than all of
the Republican statewide elected office candidates, including the
Republican candidates for governor, Meg Whitman, and U.S. Senate,
Carly Fiorina. 32 The votes against Proposition 23 were higher than the
votes for either the Democratic candidate for governor, Jerry Brown,
various sophisticated statistical methods to address it, including using more fine-grained voting
data at the precinct level).
23. For instance, California's 23rd Congressional district in the 113th Congress was given
a partisan voting index ("PVI") of +18 Republican by the Cook Political Report, which would
make the district tied with the second-most conservative district in Oklahoma (the most
conservative district in Oklahoma has a PVI of +24 Republican). See THE COOK POLITICAL
REPORT, PARTISAN VOTING INDEX, DISTRICTS OF THE 113TH CONGRESS: 2004 & 2008, at 2A.3, 2A.7
(2012),
available
at
http://cookpolitical.com/application/writable/uploads/2012_PVI-byDistrict.pdf.
24. 39.23 percent Republican voter registration versus 34.71 percent Democrat; 54.8
percent voted against Proposition 23, and the total number of anti-Proposition 23 voters (40,501)
exceeded the total number of registered Democrats (40,168). See CAL. SEC'Y OF STATE,
STATEMENT OF VOTE: NOVEMBER 2, 2010, GENERAL ELECTION 2, 91 (2011), available at
http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/sov/2010-general/complete-sov.pdf.
25. 42.88 percent Republican voter registration versus 32.32 percent Democrat; 50.6
percent voted against Proposition 23, and the total number of anti-Proposition 23 voters (9,742)
exceeded the total number of registered Democrats (9,288). Id.
26. 44.92 percent Republican voter registration versus 30.19 percent Democrat; 51.1
percent voted against Proposition 23, and the total number of anti-Proposition 23 voters (38,309)
exceeded the total number of registered Democrats (32,579). Id.
27. 40.04 percent Republican voter registration versus 33.66 percent Democrat; 55.20
percent voted against Proposition 23, and the total number of anti-Proposition 23 voters (24,781)
exceeded the total number of registered Democrats (20,668). Id.
28. 48.23 percent Republican voter registration versus 28.89 percent Democrat; 52.20
percent voted against Proposition 23, and the total number of anti-Proposition 23 voters (71,800)
exceeded the total number of registered Democrats (58,609). Id.
29. 39.89 percent Republican voter registration versus 34.96 percent Democrat; 57.20
percent voted against Proposition 23, and the total number of anti-Proposition 23 voters (58,159)
exceeded the total number of registered Democrats (54,715). Id. at 2, 92.
30. 41.87 percent Republican voter registration versus 36.29 percent Democrat; 51.10
percent voted against Proposition 23. In this county, the total number of anti-Proposition 23
voters (240,366) did not exceed the total number of registered Democrats (311,312). Id.
31. 36.27 percent Republican voter registration versus 35.92 percent Democrat; 56.20
percent voted against Proposition 23. In this county, the total number of anti-Proposition 23
voters (490,431) did not exceed the total number of registered Democrats (518,080). Id.
32. See infra Table 2 (providing numerical data).
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or U.S. Senate, Barbara Boxer. 33 Indeed, Proposition 23 lost by a
margin comparable to the landslide victory for President Obama in
2008, even though the electorate in 2010 was older and whiter. 34 The
degree of defeat for Proposition 23 was historically quite large as well:
of the 126 statewide ballot measures in California from the March
2000 primary election onward, Proposition 23's "for" vote total was
almost a standard deviation below the average. 35
The history of energy legislation in California also belies any
claims that the vote for Proposition 23 was purely determined by
partisanship. The most vocal advocate for climate change policy in
California was Arnold Schwarzenegger, the Republican Governor from
2003 to 2010.36 Legislative passage for twelve major energy and
climate change bills enacted since 2002 generally involved some level
of bipartisan support: approximately fifteen percent of Assembly
Republicans and twenty percent of Senate Republicans voted for final
passage of these bills, with no discernible decline in support over
time. 37 Indeed, eighteen percent of Assembly Republicans and twenty
percent of Senate Republicans in 2011 voted for SBX1-2, 38 which
required thirty-three percent of electricity in California to come from
renewable sources by 2020, an extremely aggressive mandate.
Another comparison that makes clear that California voters do
not automatically vote for the "liberal" position in initiatives is
between the outcome on Proposition 23 and another high-profile
initiative to repeal an important liberal policy triumph in California.
Just two years before, California voters had barely approved
Proposition 8, which undid a California Supreme Court ruling that

33. See infra Table 2 (providing numerical data).
34. President Obama won 61.1 percent of the vote in California in 2008, while Senator
McCain won thirty-seven percent of the vote. CAL. SEC'Y OF STATE, STATEMENT OF VOTE:
NOVEMBER 4, 2008, GENERAL ELECTION 8 (2008). For national comparisons on voter
demographics from 2008 to 2010, see Ezra Klein, Democrats Lost Big Because Young Voters
3,
2010,
10:48
AM),
WASH.
POST
WONKBLOG
(Nov.
Stayed
Home,
http://voices.washingtonpost.com/ezra-klein/2010/11/democratslost big_ because-you.html; see
also MARK DICAMILLO & MERVIN FIELD, FIELD RESEARCH CORP., THE FIELD POLL, RELEASE No.
2366, at 4-5 (2010), available at http://www.field.com/fieldpollonline/subscribers/Rls2366.pdf
(finding that likely California voters in 2010 were older, whiter, more conservative, and more
male than overall registered voters).
35. The average "for" vote was 50.3 percent and the standard deviation was 13.8 percent.
36. See Hanemann, supra note 9, at 17-23 (describing Schwarzenegger's central role in
advancing the passage of AB 32).
37. See infra Tables 5 & 6.
38. See infra Tables 5 & 6.
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held that prohibiting same-sex marriage was unconstitutional. 3 9 Many
counties that voted against Proposition 23 voted for Proposition 8.40
The outcome in the vote on Proposition 8-in which voters changed
the legal status quo-also demonstrates that the vote on Proposition
23 cannot be purely explained by voter resistance to changing the law
through the ballot box.
Nor was the vote on Proposition 23 a low-turnout affair that
was determined only by those most interested in climate change
policy: the number of votes on Proposition 23 was higher than that for
many other propositions on the ballot (third highest of the nine
measures on the ballot), 41 and comparable to that for contested statewide and Congressional races. 42 Of the 10,300,392 total voters in the
2010 elections in California, 9,778,407 cast a vote on Proposition 23.
Californians are famously proenvironmental, 43 and support for
environmental causes in general was strongly associated with
39. Proposition 8 was enacted by a vote of 52.3 percent to 47.7 percent. CAL. SEC'Y OF
STATE, supra note 34, at 13.
40. For instance, all of the counties listed above, as well as major counties that
traditionally vote Democratic or are swing counties, such as Los Angeles and Sacramento, voted
for Proposition 8. Id. at 60-62.
41. See infra Table 2. The measures with higher vote totals were Proposition 19 and
Proposition 21. Several of the other measures on the ballot were very high profile: Proposition 19
sought to legalize marijuana in California; Propositions 20 and 27 addressed redistricting of
congressional and state legislature seats; Propositions 22 and 25 sought to reform the state
budget process (a major issue given California's ongoing budget crisis).
42. See infra Table 2 (providing numerical results).
43. Despite California's reputation as a tree-hugging state, on some polling questions there
are not significant differences between the environmental preferences of Californians and those
of Americans at large. Compare, e.g., MARK BALDASSARE ET AL., PUB. POLICY INST. OF CAL.,
CALIFORNIANS & THE ENVIRONMENT 20 (2011), available at http://www.ppic.org/content/
pubs/survey/S-711MBS.pdf (finding in a July 2011 poll that fifty-six percent of Californians
believe the federal government is not doing enough to address global warming), MARK
BALDASSARE ET AL., PUB. POLICY INST. OF CAL., CALIFORNIANS & THE ENVIRONMENT 8 (2010),
available at http://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/survey/S_710MBS.pdf (finding in a July 2010 poll
that seventy-nine percent of Californians believe the government should address climate change
through regulation of emissions), and MARK DICAMILLO & MERVIN FIELD, FIELD RESEARCH
available at
(2011),
at
3
No.
2380,
RELEASE
POLL,
THE FIELD
CORP.,
http://www.field.com/fieldpollonline/subscribers/Rs2380.pdf (finding in a June 2011 poll that
thirty-eight percent of Californians support building more nuclear power plants), with JON
KROSNICK & ANA VILLAR, STANFORD WOODS INST. FOR THE ENV'T, GLOBAL WARMING POLL, at

Q33b (2010), available at http://woods.stanford.edu/docs/surveys/Global-Warming-SurveySelected-Results-June2010.pdf (finding in a June 2010 poll that seventy-six percent of Americans
believe the government should address climate change thi'ough regulation of greenhouse gas
emissions), ANTHONY LEISEROWITZ ET AL., YALE UNIV. & GEORGE MASON UNIV., CLIMATE
CHANGE IN THE AMERICAN MIND: PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR CLIMATE & ENERGY POLICIES IN MAY
2011, at 3 (2011), available at http://environment.yale.edulclimate/files/PolicySupport
May2011.pdf (finding in a May 2011 poll that fifty-four percent of Americans believe the
President should do more to address global warming and fifty-seven percent believe the U.S.
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opposition to Proposition 23. For instance, there was a strong
correlation at the county level between a No vote on Proposition 23
44
and a Yes vote on Proposition 21 on the same ballot; Proposition 21
would have imposed an eighteen dollar registration fee on all
automobiles in the state to support state parks (and would have
granted all registered vehicle owners in the state free access to state
parks).4 5
But Californians also do not automatically vote for every ballot
initiative that purports to help the environment. Other ballot
initiatives in November 2010 can be plausibly characterized as
environmental or environmentally related, yet in those initiatives the
proenvironment side lost: Proposition 21, while supported by
environmental groups, failed by a vote of 57.3 percent against to 42.7
percent for;4 6 accordingly, significant numbers of No voters on
Proposition 21 also voted No on Proposition 23. Proposition 26 would
have required a two-thirds vote for any increase in government fees,
expanding the state constitutional requirement for two-thirds votes
for tax increases; 4 7 it was opposed by environmental groups, but it
passed by 52.5 for to 47.5 against. 48 Environmental initiatives have
regularly failed in past elections in California as well, often by
significant margins: Proposition 87 in 2006 would have imposed a
severance tax on oil and gas extraction in California to fund renewable
energy research; it was defeated 54.6 percent against to 45.4 percent
for. 4 9 Proposition 130 in 1990 ("Forests Forever") would have imposed
significant restrictions on timber harvesting in California, with a focus
on protecting old-growth forests. Even though the initiative campaign
Congress should do more), and LEISEROWITZ ET AL., supra, at 8, 14 (finding in a May 2011 poll
that forty-seven percent of Americans support building more nuclear power plants, but only
thirty-three percent support building more nuclear power plants in their local area).
44. See infra Table 4 (providing numerical evidence).
45. CAL. SEC'Y OF STATE, PROPOSITION 21: TITLE, SUMMARY, AND ANALYSIS 24 (2010),
available at http://cdn.sos.ca.gov/vig2010/general/pdflenglishl21-title-summ-analysis.pdf.
46. See infra Table 2; see also CAL. SEC'Y OF STATE, PROPOSITION 21: ARGUMENTS AND
REBUTTALS 28 (2010), available at http://cdn.sos.ca.gov/vig20lO/general/pdflenglishl21-argrebuttals.pdf (identifying at least two California environmental groups as sponsors of ballot
arguments in favor of Proposition 21).
CAL. SEC'Y OF STATE, PROPOSITION 26: TITLE, SUMMARY, AND ANALYSIS 56 (2010),
47.
available at http://cdn.sos.ca.gov/vig2010/general/pdflenglish/26-title-summ-analysis.pdf.
48. See infra Table 2; see also CAL. SECY OF STATE, PROPOSITION 26: ARGUMENTS AND
REBUTTALS 60 (2010), available at http://cdn.sos.ca.gov/vig2010/general/pdflenglish/26-argrebuttals.pdf (identifying the California League of Conservation Voters as a sponsor of ballot
arguments opposed to Proposition 26).
49. See infra Table 3; see also CAL. SEC'Y OF STATE, CALIFORNIA GENERAL ELECTION:
OFFICIAL VOTER INFORMATION GUIDE 70 (2006), available at http://vote2006.sos.ca.gov/
voterguide/pdflEnglish.pdf (providing a description of Proposition 87).
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coincided with the height of political battles over protecting redwood
forests in northern California, the initiative failed 53.13 percent
against to 47.87 percent for.50 A study of environmental initiatives in
California from 1970 through 1994 found that the environmental side
won in only about half of the contests.5 1
Finally, while it is the case that propositions usually face a
"burden of persuasion" with voters, such that undecided voters tend to
vote against propositions for which they have very little information, 52
50. See infra Table 3. One recent environmental initiative that did pass in California
passed by a smaller margin than the margin of defeat for Proposition 23. In 2002, Proposition 40
authorized the issuance of four billion dollars in bonds to support park expansion and
environmental restoration work. CAL. SEC'Y OF STATE, CALIFORNIA PRIMARY ELECTION: OFFICIAL
VOTER INFORMATION GUIDE 6 (2002), available at http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/

viguidepe02/bppe02.pdf. This initiative passed by a margin of 56.9 percent for and 43.1 percent
against. See infra Table 3. No money was spent in the campaign in opposition to Proposition 40.
California Online Voter Guide: 2002, CAL. VOTER FOUND., http://www.calvoter.org/voter/
elections/archive/2002/primary/propositions/topten.html (last updated May 10, 2002). In 2008,
two ballot initiatives that purported to be proenvironmental, but in fact were highly
controversial and did not receive strong support from environmental groups, were defeated:
Proposition 7, which would have greatly expanded the state's renewable portfolio standard, was
seen as overly ambitious and counterproductive by major state environmental groups; and
Proposition 10, which would have given massive subsidies to natural gas-fueled vehicles, was
also seen as counterproductive and as the pet project of a Texas billionaire. See infra Table 3
(showing vote totals); see also Tom Zeller, Jr., CaliforniaRenewable-Energy Initiatives Defeated,
N.Y. TIMES GREEN BLOG (Nov. 5, 2008, 10:06 AM), http://green.blogs.nytimes.com/
2008/11/05/california-renewable-energy-initiatives-tank/ (discussing details of the initiatives).
Like Proposition 23, two other significant ballot measures in recent California political
history were opposed by environmental groups. Of those, one was defeated by a larger margin
than Proposition 23. Proposition 138 in 1990 ("The Big Stump," as it was nicknamed by its
opponents) was a counterinitiative to the "Forests Forever" Proposition, supported by the timber
industry, including Louisiana-Pacific Corporation and Georgia-Pacific Corporation. Richard C.
Paddock, Proposition 130: Logging Firms Portray Themselves as Environmentalists, L.A. TIMES,
Nov. 3, 1990, http://articles.latimes.com/1990-11-03/news/mn-3222_1_timber-industry.

It would

have allowed for deregulation of the timber industry in California, and it failed 71.16 percent
against to 28.84 percent for. Infra Table 3. Proposition 90 in 2006 would have greatly expanded

the circumstances in which the government would be required to compensate property owners
for loss of value as a result of regulation. See CAL. SEC'Y OF STATE, supra note 49, at 90
(providing a description of Proposition 90). It lost in a close race, 52.4 percent against to 47.6
percent for. Infra Table 3.
51. See Matthew E. Kahn & John G. Matsusaka, Demand for Environmental Goods:
Evidence from Voting Patterns on California Initiatives, 40 J.L. & ECON. 137 (1997). Kahn and
Matsusaka identify sixteen environmentally related initiatives from 1970 through 1994, of which
only six passed; however, two of these initiatives were opposed by environmental groups and
neither passed. Thus, the overall success rate of environmental groups in California among the

initiatives studied was fifty percent (eight of sixteen).
52. See SHAUN BOWLER & TODD DONOVAN, DEMANDING CHOICES: OPINION, VOTING, AND
DIRECT DEMOCRACY 43-66 (1st paperback ed. 2000) (showing, for example, that negative voting
increases as more ill-informed voters are drawn into the electorate); Michael S. Kang,

Democratizing Direct Democracy: Restoring Voter Competence Through Heuristic Cues and
"DisclosurePlus", 50 UCLA L. REV. 1141, 1155-56 (2003) (showing how campaign spending is
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this also does not appear to fully explain the substantial margin of
defeat for Proposition 23, which lost by the largest amount of any of
the propositions on the 2010 ballot and by a significant amount
historically. 3
B. The Interest Group Landscape for the Proposition23 Campaign
So why did Proposition 23 fail by such a large margin? One
place to start is the financial records for the campaign for Proposition
23. As noted above, opponents of the Proposition outspent proponents
by a significant margin. This runs counter to the standard prediction
of social scientists that policy proposals with concentrated costs and
diffuse benefits (such as most environmental regulation) will tend to
be at a disadvantage politically, particularly in terms of resources. 54
Two sets of interest groups would appear to have the most at
stake in any outcome of Proposition 23: renewable energy companies
that would benefit from restrictions on carbon-based energy, and the
oil and gas industry, which is the California industry most directly
harmed by regulatory efforts to restrict carbon emissions. Based on
those interests, one would expect these groups to have been heavily
involved in the campaign on each side. Interestingly, the story told by
the campaign finance records is not that simple.55 While there was
more effective in opposition to a ballot measure than in support of one, in the absence of heuristic
cues).
53. See infra Tables 2 & 3 (providing vote totals).
54. According to public choice theory, large groups that receive small per capita benefits or
face small per capita costs will be at a substantial organizational disadvantage compared to
small groups that receive large per capita benefits or face large per capita costs. See generally
MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS
1-3 (Harvard Univ. Press rev. ed. 1971); PATASHNIK, supra note 5, at 7-8 (summarizing the
political science literature); Eric Biber, The Importance of Resource Allocation in Administrative
Law, 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 42-49 (2008) (showing repercussions of the theory in a regulatory
context). Climate change policy is intended to reduce the damage to the global climate from
carbon dioxide emissions. The benefits of such policy are public goods that are distributed across
the population of the entire planet. The costs of such policy (at least direct costs) are
disproportionately felt by large industrial organizations that produce or use large amounts of
fossil fuels, such as oil companies and automobile manufacturers. Accordingly, one would expect
the opponents of climate regulation to generally have a substantial organizational advantage,
and therefore a resource advantage. I expand further on this point below.
The public choice dynamics discussed here are not insurmountable, as the passage of
numerous environmental statutes in the past forty years makes clear. See Daniel A. Farber,

Politics and Procedure in Environmental Law, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 59 (1992); see also infra note
183 and accompanying text (comparing the resources brought to bear by environmentalists and
industry in the debate over federal climate legislation).
55. Nor is the story from county-level voting patterns that simple. Neither the amount of
energy produced by renewable projects within a county, nor the potential energy that renewable
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prominent press coverage of support by Silicon Valley renewable
energy venture capitalists for the "No on 23" campaign,56 and while
renewable energy companies and venture capitalists did donate
substantial amounts to the "No on 23" campaign, their donations were
both relatively late in the campaign and also only comprised a
minority of the overall donations.57 Much of the anti-23 contributions
were from individual donors, nonprofits, or unions.58 Why renewable
projects could produce within a county, had any correlation with the final vote on Proposition 23.
See infra Table 4. Of course, renewable energy production represents only a fraction of the
impact that the renewable energy industry has on the state economy. Energy production and
potential totals are underinclusive measures of the economic impacts of renewable energy, as
they exclude the production of renewable energy equipment and renewable energy innovation.
56. See, e.g., Todd Woody, A Foilfor the Koch Brothers?, N.Y. TIMES GREEN BLOG (Mar. 15,
2011,
2:28
PM),
http://green.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/03/15/a-foil-for-the-koch-brothers/
(discussing the role of a prominent venture capitalist in opposition to Proposition 23). Leading
Silicon Valley trade associations also opposed Proposition 23. See Marc Lifisher, Ballot
Initiatives Divide a Usually United Business Front, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 31, 2010, http://articles.
latimes.com/2010/oct/31/business/la-fi-business-election-20101031 (noting opposition of Silicon
Valley Leadership Group); Andrew S. Ross, More Heavy Hitters Say "No" to Prop 23, THE
BOTTOM LINE (Oct. 19, 2010, 3:16 PM), http://blog.sfgate.com/ bottomline/2010/10/19/more-heavyhitters-say-no-to-prop-23/?tsp=1 (highlighting a statement from leading Silicon Valley investors
opposed to Proposition 23).
57. Corporations and individuals with a clear cleantech affiliation represented at least
thirty percent of the total. This is likely a conservative estimate since many individuals did not
indicate their affiliation. Approximately three million dollars was donated by two leading
venture capitalists in the cleantech industry (or their spouses): John Doerr and Vinod Khosla.
CaliforniaProp. 23 - Campaign Contributions - Nov. 2010, supra note 15. Another five million
dollars was donated by Thomas Steyer (and his wife), who the press describes as heavily involved
in cleantech venture capital. Id.; see also Adam Nagourney, CaliforniaBraces for Showdown on
Emissions, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/17/us/17pollute.html
(noting support by venture capitalists for "No on 23" campaign).
Contributions from venture capitalists in the cleantech industry did not come in until later in
the campaign. See Margot Roosevelt, Prop. 23 Foes PouringMoney into Campaign, L.A. TIMES,
Oct. 15, 2010, http://articles.latimes.com/2010/oct/15/local/la-me-prop-23-20101015 (indicating
that most donations from cleantech sources to "No on 23" campaign came in late September and
early October); Emilie Middlesworth, Alternative Energy Companies Clean Energy, KiOR, Inc.
Fund Prop. 23 Opposition, MAPLIGHT (Oct. 28, 2010), http://maplight.org/content/72417 (noting
late contributions to opposition campaign from alternative energy corporations).
58. Approximately sixty percent of the funding for the opposition to Proposition 23 came
from individuals. See California Prop. 23 - Campaign Contributions- Nov. 2010, supra note 15.
Among the top contributors were environmental organizations (such as National Wildlife
Federation, the League of Conservation Voters, and The Nature Conservancy), and wealthy
individuals or philanthropists not directly connected to cleantech (such as Bill Gates, the spouse
of a Google cofounder, an Intel cofounder, the sons of the founder of Gap, and hedge fund
managers). See id. Overall, while renewable energy industry lobbying has grown substantially in
recent years, Cassandra LaRussa, Solar, Wind Power Groups Becoming Prominent Washington
Lobbying ForcesAfter Years of Relative Obscurity, OPEN SECRETS BLOG (Aug. 25, 2010, 4:41 PM),
http://www.opensecrets.org/news/2010/08/solar-wind-power-groups-becoming-pr.html,
the
renewable energy industry still invests only a fraction of what other major industries (such as oil
and gas) invest into lobbying efforts. See, e.g., Sarah Laskow, How Big is "Big Wind'?, AM.
PROSPECT, June 17, 2011, http://prospect.org/article/how-big-big-wind (comparing expenditures
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energy did not play a larger or earlier role in the campaign is
somewhat mysterious. It could be because new industries are more
reluctant to play in the political arena, because the regulatory system
most at issue in Proposition 23 did not directly affect the energy
policies that most benefited renewable energy companies,5 9 or because
the renewable energy industry did not feel a need to contribute in
large amounts because of the substantial public donations.
Also surprising is the pattern of donations on the other side of
the ledger. Not only did oil and gas companies donate the vast
majority of money for the "Yes on 23" campaign, but the vast majority
of the Yes money also came from outside of the state.6 0 Two Texas oil
companies, Valero and Tesoro, were the largest two individual
contributors to the "Yes on 23" campaign.6 1 Valero, the largest single
contributor, has multiple California refineries and a substantial
California retail presence. 62 Valero and Tesoro saw AB 32 as a threat
to their market position because, as independent refining companies
without their own oil-production facilities, they depended exclusively
on the low-margin refining business for profits, a business that is
particularly vulnerable to downturns in gasoline consumption (due to,
for instance, greenhouse gas regulation). 63 To make matters worse for
both Valero and Tesoro, they had invested in particularly capitalintensive refineries for "dirty," heavy, high-sulfur oil64 that is
between the alternative energy industry and the oil and gas industry in 2010); LaRussa, supra
(comparing expenditures between the alternative energy industry and other energy-related
industries in 1998).
59. For example, Proposition 23 would not have directly affected California's Renewable
Portfolio Standard ("RPS"), which requires utilities to buy a certain proportion of their electricity
from renewable sources.

60.

See California Prop. 23 - Campaign Contributions - Nov. 2010, supra note 15

(indicating that more than seventy percent of total Yes funding came from outside the state).
61. See id. (indicating that these two companies, both of which are headquartered in Texas,
combined to contribute 66.8 percent of total Yes funding).
http://www.valero.com/OURBUSINESS/Pages/
Company History, VALERO,
62. See
CompanyHistory.aspx (last visited Oct. 14, 2012).
63. See ANTHONY ANDREWS, ROBERT PIROG & MOLLY F. SHERLOCK, CONG. RESEARCH
SERV., R41478, THE U.S. OIL REFINING INDUSTRY: BACKGROUND IN CHANGING MARKETS AND
FUEL POLICIES 17-19 (2010) (describing the profitability of independent oil refining companies).
Large integrated companies such as ExxonMobil, which have their own production facilities,
stayed out of the Proposition 23 campaign, perhaps because the integrated companies can make
money from oil production and refining. Id. at 18 (noting that Valero, an independent refiner,
does not own petroleum reserves); see also Jad Mouawad, Chilly Climate for Oil Refiners, N.Y.
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/24/business/energy-environment
2009,
Dec. 24,
TIMES,
/24refining.html?_ r=0 ("Plagued by boom-and-bust cycles of rapid expansion followed by sharp
belt-tightening, refining companies have often struggled to operate at a profit.").
64. See THE ELLA BAKER CTR. & CAL. ENVTL. JUSTICE ALLIANCE, THE Toxic TWINS: DUO
BEHIND ENVIRONMENTAL ROLLBACK ARE TWO OF CALIFORNIA'S BIGGEST SOURCES OF DEADLY
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particularly vulnerable to drops in gasoline demand.65 These
investments were also particularly vulnerable to one of the regulatory
standards proposed for adoption by California under AB 32: a "lowcarbon fuel standard" that would penalize refining that required
significant energy inputs, such as refining high-sulfur oil.66
CHEMICALS 3 (2011), available at http://caleja.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/06/2010
0810_toxictwins.pdf (stating the Valero and Tesoro have expanded their capacity in California
to process sulfur-laden types of oil known as "sour" and "heavy" crudes); VALERO ENERGY CORP.,
OPERATING HIGHLIGHTS AND THROUGHPUT VOLUMES & YIELDS 8-16 (2012), available at

http://www.valero.com/InvestorRelations/Documents/2012%200perating%2OHighlights%202002
%20through%202Q2012.pdf (showing reliance on heavy oil at California refineries); Wilmington,
VALERO,
http://www.valero.com/OurBusiness/OurLocations/Refineries/Pages/Wilmington.aspx
(last visited Oct. 14, 2012) (noting that Valero's Wilmington, California refinery focuses on
heavy, high-sulfur oil).
65. See Kirsten Korosec, Valero Energy Hunkers Down in ChallengingSour Crude Refining
Market, CBS NEWS (July 28, 2009), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-505123_162-43040615/valeroenergy-hunkers-down-in-challenging-sour-crude-refining-market/ (noting that "Valero's heavy,
sour crude refining operations have been hit especially hard" due to low demand for fuel).
66. See DAVID MONTGOMERY ET AL., CHARLES RIVER Assocs., ECONOMIC AND ENERGY
IMPACTS RESULTING FROM A NATIONAL Low CARBON FUEL STANDARD 21-23, 25 (2010), available

at http://consumerenergyalliance.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2010/06/CRA-LCFS-Final-ReportJune-14-2010.pdf (showing that petroleum demand is negatively influenced by the Low Carbon
Fuel Standards ("LCFS") mandate); DAVE REED, TESORO COS., INC., CLIMATE CHANGE UPDATE AB32/Low CARBON FUEL STANDARD 1, 13-14 (2010), available at http://wonkroom.thinkprogress

.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/07/TesoroPresentation.pdf? mobile=nc (stating that AB 32 will
cause refineries to undergo thinning margins, potentially causing shutdown of some refineries);
MICHAEL WHATLEY, HBW RES., Low CARBON FUEL STANDARDS: DEVELOPMENT, MECHANICS, AND

IMPACTS 9 (2009), available at http://consumerenergyalliance.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2009
/07/microsoft-powerpoint-argus-crude-oil-summit-presentation-compatibility-mode.pdf
(stating
that the penalty scheme will act as a tax on high-carbon fuels); HAROLD YORK, WOOD
MACKENZIE, IMPLICATIONS FOR CRUDE OIL CARBON INTENSITY DIFFERENTIATION UNDER THE
LCFS 5, 9-11 (2011), available at http://www.arb.ca.gov/fuels/lcfs/workgroups/advisorypanel
/20110630 WoodMackenzie.pdf (stating that heavy crude refineries operate on smaller margins,
and that high fuel prices are likely to negatively affect all oil refining margins). Valero had also
recently invested heavily in ethanol, which California regulators had characterized as a highcarbon fuel that should be disfavored (despite its nominal "alternative energy" status). See
VALERO, IP WEEK DOWNSTREAM SESSION 45 (2011), available at http://webcache.
googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:bGZqes56XUJ:www.energyinst.org/filegrab/%3Fref%/3D
901%26f%3DWoodMackenzieGlobalRefining...+%22IP+week+downstream+session%22&cd=1&hl
=en&ct-clnk&gl=us&client=safari (stating that the carbon emissions deficit from crude oil
refining must be offset by blending in more low CI fuels); Mouawad, supra note 63 ("We
recognize that ethanol is an important side of the fuel mix that is not going to go anywhere.").
One out-of-state oil company that contributed to the Proposition 23 campaign did not have
any California refineries. Flint Hill Resources, a subsidiary of Koch Industries, had a new facility
in Minnesota designed to handle Canadian tar sands oils that would be disfavored under a low
carbon fuel standard that Minnesota was considering; Koch Industries accordingly opposed low
carbon fuel standards in general. Lowering Standards?, DISCOVERY: THE QUARTERLY
NEWSLETTER OF KOCH COMPANIES (Koch Indus., Inc., Wichita, Kan.), Jan. 2010, available at
http://www.kochind.com/perspectives/perspectives-detail.aspx?id=20.
Other companies also
expressed concerns that additional states might also adopt California's low-carbon fuel
standards. See WHATLEY, supra, at 10 (stating that several states in the Northeast and Pacific
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In contrast, the oil and gas industry in California kept a much
lower profile. Chevron, one of the largest oil companies in the country,
with its headquarters and many of its refining facilities in California,
stayed neutral in the campaign.67 Chevron's neutrality in the
campaign might have in part been the result of significant
investments it had already undertaken to make its California
operations more efficient.68
Other major California industries that would seem to have a
major stake in climate change policy either stayed neutral or even
opposed Proposition 23. The California Chamber of Commerce, for
instance, took no position on the initiative (in sharp contrast to the
opposition of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce to federal climate
legislation being considered at the same time).69 California electricity
and gas utilities either stayed neutral or opposed.70 Pacific Gas and
Electric ("PG&E"), one of the largest electric utilities in the state,

Northwest might follow California's lead); see also CHARLES RIVER ASSOCS., supra, at 8 (noting
some detrimental effects of a nationwide LCFS).
67. CaliforniaProp. 23 - Campaign Contributions- Nov. 2010, supra note 15. Only a few
medium-sized and some small California oil companies contributed to the Proposition 23
campaign. Occidental Petroleum, based in southern California, donated three hundred thousand
dollars; Tower Energy, based in northern California, donated two hundred thousand dollars;
World Oil Corp., also based in southern California, donated one hundred thousand. Id. See
generally Roosevelt, supra note 57 (stating that support for Prop. 23 was funded primarily by oil
refiners).
68. See Letter from Stephen D. Burns, Manager of Cal. Gov't Affairs, Chevron, to Lawrence
Goulder, Econ. and Allocation Advisory Comm. Chair, Cal. Air Res. Bd. (Nov. 24, 2009), available
at http://www.climatechange.ca.gov/eaac/comments/2009-11-24 Chevronletter.pdf (describing
initiatives that Chevron had undertaken in pursuit of energy efficiency and arguing that
companies who have excelled in this area should not be punished under Prop. 23 for their early,
affirmative approach to energy efficiency). There are, of course, other possible reasons for
Chevron's position. See infra text accompanying notes 100-04.
69. See ERIC POOLEY, THE CLIMATE WAR, 202-03 (2010) (describing efforts by the U.S.
Chamber of Commerce to stop climate legislation at the federal level); Marc Lifsher, Ballot

Initiatives Divide a

Usually

United Business Front, L.A.

TIMES,

Oct.

31,

2010,

the
(noting
http://articles.latimes.com/2010/oct/31/business/la-fi-business-election-20101031
neutrality of the California Chamber of Commerce); see also View Endorsementsand Share Your
http://californiachoices.org/ballot-measures-2010-11/
CALIFORNIACHOICES.ORG,
Vote,
endorsements (last updated Oct. 19, 2012) (listing endorsements by major California
organizations). The California Chamber of Commerce has taken strong positions against other
environmental legislation in the state. See, e.g., Strong Opposition Keeps Ban on Foam Food
Containers in Assembly, CALCHAMBER (Sept. 21, 2011), http://www.calchamber.com/Headlines/
Pages/09212011-StrongOppositionKeepsBanonFoamFoodContainersinAssembly.aspx
(highlighting successful opposition to the proposed polystyrene food container ban). The
California Manufacturers and Technology Association did support Proposition 23. See Roosevelt,
supra note 57.
70. No California electric utility contributed to the Proposition 23 campaign. The three
largest utilities all opposed it. Lifsher, supra note 69.
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contributed to the opposition to Proposition 23.71 PG&E's stance
appeared to reflect two factors: first, its significant investment in
renewable energy and other low-carbon energy projects in response to
prior California energy legislation; 72 second, the regulatory structure
governing electricity utility rates in California that had for decades
supported utility efforts to encourage their consumers to conserve
energy, in contrast to the traditional model, which simply paid
utilities for increased production and consumption of energy. 73
This interest group landscape made it relatively easy for the
No side to raise much more money than the Yes side in the campaign.
That dominance of funding for the No side may have had a significant
impact on voting behavior: while there is some uncertainty about how
exactly spending in initiative campaigns affects voting behavior, it
does seem that spending in opposition to initiatives is often
successful. 74 Again, because of the lack of funds for Proposition 23
from major business interests within the state, proponents likely had
a harder job raising funds for their campaign and opponents likely had
a much easier time, making the uphill battle for Proposition 23 even
steeper.
The interest group landscape also affected the rhetoric of the
campaign in a way that might also have altered voting behavior. The
dominance of out-of-state donations on the Yes side of the campaign75

71. PG&E was one of the top eighteen contributors to the opposition campaign, donating
five hundred thousand dollars. CaliforniaProp. 23 - Campaign Contributions- Nov. 2010, supra
note 15. PG&E also supported the initial enactment of AB 32 in 2006. Fighting Climate Change,
PAC. GAS & ELEC., http://www.pge.com/myhome/environment/pge/climate/ (last visited Oct. 14,
2012).
72. POOLEY, supra note 69, at 60-61 (describing how PG&E began canceling plans for coalfired plant construction in the late 1970s and shifting investments into renewable energy and
efficiency); DeShazo & Freeman, supra note 5, at 1509 n.24 (noting that heavy investment by
PG&E into hydropower and natural gas has led PG&E to be more supportive of greenhouse gas
regulation than other utilities).
73. POOLEY, supra note 69, at 60-61 (noting the Californian origins of the reforms).
74. See SHAUN BOWLER & TODD ANDREW DONOVAN, DEMANDING CHOICES: OPINION,
VOTING, AND DIRECT DEMOCRACY 54 (2000) (stating that people tend to vote against measures
where the "no" side dominated campaign spending); Elizabeth Garrett, Money, Agenda Setting,
and Direct Democracy, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1845, 1847 (1999) (arguing that funding in opposition of
an initiative is far more effective than funding in support); David G. Magleby, Let the Voters
Decide? An Assessment of the Initiative and Referendum Process, 66 U. COLO. L. REV. 13, 39
(1994) ("Well-funded campaigns make a difference in initiative outcomes, generally by fostering
more 'no' voting."). But see Thomas Stratmann, Is Spending More Potent for or Against a
Proposition?Evidence from Ballot Measures, 50 AM. J. POL. SCI. 788, 788 (2006) (finding that
proponent spending is as effective as opponent spending).
75. See California Prop. 23 - Campaign Contributions - Nov. 2010, supra note 15
(indicating that approximately seventy-one percent of the contributions for the Yes campaign
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allowed the opponents of Proposition 23 to cast the initiative as an
effort by "Texas oil companies" to dictate Californian policy.7 6 Polling
data during the campaign indicated the effectiveness of this message
to Californian voters.77 This makes sense, since low-information voters
in initiative campaigns often rely on heuristic cues in making voting
decisions, and an important heuristic cue can be which interest groups
support an initiative.78 Voters often conclude that if a particular
special interest is the dominant supporter of an initiative, that
initiative is not in the public interest and should be opposed.79
Because so much of the money in support of Proposition 23 came from
not just oil companies, but out-of-state oil companies, it was a
relatively easy argument for opponents to make that the Proposition
was an effort to get special favors for special interests.
A third way in which the interest group landscape might have
affected voter decisions has to do with economic impacts of the
initiative. A major argument made by the "No on 23" campaign was
that "green jobs" in the renewable energy industry were an important
part of California's economic future and would have been threatened
came from out of state, while approximately thirty percent of the contributions for the No
campaign came from out of state).
76. See, e.g., Official Voter Information Guide, Prop 23, CAL. SEC'Y OF STATE,
(last
http://voterguide.sos.ca.gov/past/2010/general/propositions/23/arguments-rebuttals.htm
visited Oct. 14, 2012) ("Big Texas oil companies and state politicians who receive oil company
money designed Prop. 23 to repeal clean energy and air pollution standards in California.");
StopDirtyEnergyProp, No on 23: (Enough) TVAd, YOUTUBE (Nov. 1, 2010), http://www.youtube
.com/user/stopdirtyenergyprop (arguing that Prop. 23 allows Texas oil companies to benefit at
California's expense). A popular campaign sign distributed by one of the groups opposing
Proposition 23 read "Stop Texas Oil: Hell No on 23 & 26." Stop Texas Oil: Hell No on 23 & 26,
CREDO VICTORY FUND AGAINST PROP 23 & TEX. OIL Cos., http://act.credoaction
.com/campaign/stop-texas -oill (last visited Oct. 14, 2012). A YouTube channel for campaign ads
against Proposition 23 is entitled: StopTexasOil. StopTexasOil, YOUTUBE, http://www.youtube.
com/user/stoptexasoil (last visited Oct. 14, 2012).
77. See BOB EPSTEIN, ENVTL. ENTREPRENEURS, LESSONS FROM PROP 23 - WINNING
ENVIRONMENTAL CAMPAIGNS IN THE "TEA PARTY" ERA 19 (2011), available at http://www.e2.
org/jsp/controller?docName=lessonsfromprop23 (stating that a top message among persuadable
voters was that Prop. 23 was "funded primarily by two Texas oil companies who are two of the
worst polluters in California"); see also Bradford Plumer, In California, Climate Politics Are
Tricky... For Republicans, THE NEW REPUBLIC (Sept. 8, 2010, 1:45 PM), http://www.tnr.com
(suggesting that big
/blog/the-vine/77527/in-california-climate-politics-are-tricky-republicans
petroleum companies have gotten into trouble for opposing California's climate law).
78. BOWLER & DONOVAN, supra note 74, at 149-50; Kang, supranote 52, at 1157-60.
79. For instance, a study of voter behavior in a 1988 California election found that voters,
when presented with five competing initiatives to reform car insurance rates and regulation in
the state, used information about which initiative was supported by which interest group to
identify and reject the proindustry initiatives. Arthur Lupia, Shortcuts Versus Encyclopedias:
Information and Voting Behavior in California Insurance Reform Elections, 88 AM. POL. SCI.
REV. 63, 63, 72 (1994).
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by the repeal of AB 32.80 Polling by the "No on 23" campaign indicated
that the jobs argument had great traction for many voters.81 That
argument may have had more plausibility precisely because so few instate businesses took a public position in favor of Proposition 23.
One intriguing result from the county-level vote analysis
further supports the idea that the dynamics in the campaign over
Proposition 23 were unusual compared to most political debates over
climate change policy. The per capita carbon emissions from a county
(a rough estimate of how dependent a county's economy is on burning
fossil fuels) did not have a relationship with the county's final vote on
Proposition 23. This contrasts with other research that has found an
inverse relationship between levels of carbon dioxide emissions and

80. See, e.g., EPSTEIN, supra note 77, at 19 (arguing that Prop. 23 will eliminate jobs "by
killing California's clean energy and clean technology industries"); Official Voter Information
Guide, Prop 23, supra note 76 ("California is the hub of innovation and investment in clean
energy technologies and businesses. But Prop. 23 would reverse the state's clean energy laws,
jeopardizing billions in economic growth and hundreds of thousands of jobs.");

StopDirtyEnergyProp, Prop 23 Documentary Clip: Clean Energy Economy Threatened, YoUTUBE
(Oct.
21,
2010)
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v-5MAVklD45rY&list=UUWRfviuRm
MciBtSBlyfgBFQ& index=12&feature=plcp (arguing that Prop. 23 threatens to eliminate clean
energy jobs). The Yes campaign for its part heavily emphasized the economic cost of AB 32 and
the need for jobs in a state with high unemployment. It conspicuously avoided any questioning of
climate science or of the need to address climate change, instead exclusively emphasizing the
need to adjust the timing of California's response because of the recession. See, e.g., Tom Tanton,
Op-Ed., Shelving of Climate Law Closer, ORANGE CNTY. REGISTER, May 10, 2010,
http://www.ocregister.com/opinion/state-248116-jobs-unemployment.html
(arguing
that
California must suspend AB 32 to allow for the state to recover from high unemployment and a
severe recession); Official Voter Information Guide, supra note 76 ("Other countries and states
prudently postponed implementing their global warming laws until economic conditions

improve."); YesOnProp23, Santa Maria: The Road to Building a Stronger Economy, YOUTUBE
(Sept.
1,
2010)
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bCCRspZv3bl&list=UTUbPCxKNQ4tiR3
QNDJCVUJxQ&index=10&feature=plcp (arguing that California should not go "full speed
ahead" on AB 32 at the height of a prolonged recession).
81. See, e.g., EPSTEIN, supra note 77, at 20 (indicating that sixty-five percent of voters
believed that clean technologies were and would continue to be important sources of jobs in
California). The No campaign made the role of out-of-state campaign donations and "green jobs"
two of the three prongs of its campaign (the third was the potential impact on public health of
the repeal of AB 32). The campaign consciously avoided discussing climate change as a reason for
opposing AB 32, because its polling indicated that this rationale was only important for voters
who were already firmly opposed to Proposition 23. Id. at 22 (stating that making a case against
Prop. 23 based explicitly on the need to address global warming was not an effective theme with
swing voters). Polling data at the national level in 2009-10 produced similar results. See
POOLEY, supra note 69, at 383-84, 436 (stating that climate change is the least important
message to convey to voters); see also Andrew C. Ravkin, Op-Ed., Beyond the Climate Blame
Game, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 25, 2011, 2:18 PM), http://dotearth.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/04/25
/beyond-the-climate-blame-game/ (citing polling data showing relatively weak support for
addressing climate change even among those who are most alarmed by the possibility of global
warming).
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public support for climate change policy. 82 Similarly, recent research
on congressional voting patterns on federal climate change legislation,
legislation that was pending immediately before and during the
campaign, found that the likelihood of a congressional representative
voting for climate change legislation in 2009 was highly correlated not
just with ideology and income level (higher income made such a vote
more likely) but also with the carbon emissions from the
representative's district (lower carbon emissions made such a vote
more likely). 83 The congressional debates over federal climate change
legislation in 2009 and 2010 also showed regional conflicts that were
based on the importance of carbon for local economies, including
conflicts within the Democratic Party. 84
Certainly there are important constraints in drawing
comparisons between such different data sources (county-level voting
data, polling data, and legislator voting behavior), but nonetheless the
pattern is suggestive. Partisan affiliation and ideology surely played a
role in the demise of Proposition 23: California, even in the wave
election of 2010, is overall a liberal state and a state that values
environmental protection highly, and that helped defeat Proposition
23. But in contrast to other contexts, in California the amount of

82. See Kari Marie Norgaard, Climate Denial: Emotion, Psychology, Culture, and Political
Economy, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CLIMATE CHANGE AND SOCIETY 399, 402 (2011) (citing
Hanno Sandvik, Public Concern over Global Warming Correlates Negatively with National
Wealth, 90 CLIMATIC CHANGE 333, 333 (2008)) (reporting "a 'marginally significant' tendency
that nations' per capita carbon dioxide emissions are negatively correlated to public concern");
Sammy Zahran et al., Climate Change Vulnerability and Policy Support, 19 Soc'Y & NAT.
RESOURCES 771, 783 (2006) ("[C]itizens in states with higher levels of carbon dioxide emissions
appear less likely to support personally costly climate change policies.").
83. See Michael I. Cragg & Matthew E. Kahn, Carbon Geography: The PoliticalEconomy of
Congressional Support for Legislation Intended to Mitigate Greenhouse Gas Production 19-21
(Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 14963, 2009) (indicating that reducing a
district's carbon emissions, increasing a district's per capita income, and decreasing ideology all
correlate with an increased likelihood that a representative will vote in favor of climate change
legislation); see also Stephen P. Holland et al., Some Inconvenient Truths About Climate Change
Policy: The DistributionalImpacts of TransportationPolicies 30 (MIT Ctr. for Energy & Envtl.
Pol'y Research, Working Paper No. 2011-016, 2011) (noting that greater district gains from
renewable fuel subsidies were negatively correlated with the likelihood of that district's
representative to vote in favor of cap-and-trade regulation).
84. See, e.g., POOLEY, supra note 69, at 234-35, 416 (noting opposition to climate legislation
from coal-state Democrats); id. at 390-91 (noting opposition to climate legislation from farmstate Democrats); Tom Mounteer, Comprehensive Federal Legislation to Regulate Greenhouse
Gas Emissions, 39 ENVTL. L. REP. 11,068, 11,069 (2009) (noting a feud between coastal liberals
and legislators from the Rust Belt and farm states); see also Ryan Lizza, As The World Burns,
Oct.
11,
2010,
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2010/10/11/
THE
NEW YORKER,
101011fa fact-lizza (noting the difficulty of consolidating support among legislators for the
climate change bill).
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carbon emissions at the county level is not a strong correlate with
voting patterns. It may well be that for all of the reasons given above
(lack of in-state business support for the initiative and dominance by
out-of-state players in the Yes campaign), California voters concluded
that, whatever the merits of Proposition 23, their position on it should
not be primarily determined by any potential impacts on energy prices
or the role of energy in California's economy. The lack of California
business support for Proposition 23 may have provided an important
heuristic cue to voters that AB 32 was not a major threat to their way
of life, regardless of the role that carbon plays in their local economy.85
C. California'sEnergy-Policy History and Its Politicaland Economic
Impacts
So what explains the interest group dynamics in the campaign
over Proposition 23? One explanation is the long history in California
of aggressive efforts to encourage energy conservation and renewable
energy production, beginning in the 1970s with legislation that
imposed stringent efficiency mandates for appliances in the state. 86 In

85. Note that any difference between California and the rest of the country cannot be based
on a claim that California has no significant fossil fuel industries. The state has a substantial oil
and gas industry. See Producing Wells and Productionof Oil, Gas, and Water by County - 2010*,
CAL. DEP'T OF CONSERVATION (Oct. 7, 2011), ftp://ftp.consrv.ca.gov/pub/oil/templNEWS/
ProducingWellsOilGasWater_10.pdf (summarizing oil and gas production by county in
California); Natural Gas Gross Withdrawals and Production, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Sept.
28, 2012), http://www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/ng-prod-sum_a_EPGOFPDmmcf_a.htm (indicating that
California produced over two hundred and seventy million cubic feet of natural gas in 2010).
California's oil production is approximately ten percent of total U.S. oil production, which is
greater than production in Oklahoma or Louisiana and nearly as much as in Alaska. Crude Oil
Production, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Sept. 27, 2012), http://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet
/petcrd.crpdnadcmbbl_a.htm. California's natural gas production is much smaller relative to
national levels, totaling about one percent of U.S. natural gas production. Natural Gas Gross
Withdrawals and Production,supra.
86. See Ann E. Carlson, Energy Efficiency and Federalism, 107 MICH. L. REV. FIRST
IMPRESSIONS 63, 65 (2008) (stating that the need to regulate appliances stemmed from the
misaligned incentives between the purchasers and end users of appliances); Hanemann, supra
note 9, at 4-8 (stating that one of the mandates of the California Energy Commission was to
establish appliance efficiency standards). California was the first state to enact such standards,
prompting other state standards and eventually federal standards. See STEVEN NADEL ET AL.,
AM. COUNCIL FOR AN ENERGY-EFFICIENT ECON., LEADING THE WAY: CONTINUED OPPORTUNITIES
FOR NEW STATE APPLIANCE AND EQUIPMENT EFFICIENCY STANDARDS 2-3 (2006) ("California

adopted the first appliance standards law in 1974 and in the early and mid-1980s, other states
(including Florida, Kansas, Massachusetts, and New York) adopted standards on various
products."). California has continued to be aggressive in setting standards for appliances not
covered by the federal standards. See id. (noting California's numerous recent product efficiency
standards that are not preempted by federal standards); Carlson, supra, at 68 (noting that the
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the late 1970s and early 1980s, California aggressively encouraged
renewable energy production through tax credits and other
subsidies.87 Along with the rest of the country, California took a hiatus
from aggressive alternative energy efforts from the mid-1980s through
the mid-1990s, but the state redoubled its efforts in the late 1990s. 8 8
In 2002, California imposed a renewable portfolio standard ("RPS")
that required utilities in the state to obtain twenty percent of their
electricity from renewable sources by 2017.89 In 2002, California's AB
1493 imposed regulatory standards for carbon emissions from
automobiles,90 triggering a high-profile conflict with the federal
government over whether those standards were preempted by federal
fuel-efficiency requirements. 91 In 2006, California enacted AB 32, the
Global Warming Solutions Act, which requires economy-wide
regulation of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases in the state,
coordinated through the state Air Resources Board. Table 1 provides a
full overview of California's history of energy efficiency and renewable
energy legislation. The legislation has had a significant impact on the
amount of renewable energy produced in California, and on energy
efficiency in the state over the forty years from the 1970s to the
present. 92
California has also received a tremendous amount of
investment in renewable energy and energy efficiency technology. For
instance, between 2006 and 2010 California was the recipient of
federal government has followed California's regulatory lead on at least eight separate
occasions).
87. See infra Table 1 (describing the numerous energy reform efforts undertaken by
California).
88. See infra Table 1 (showing a lack of energy reform efforts in California from the mid1980s to mid-1990s).
89. S.B. 1078, 2002 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2002).
90. A.B. 1493, 2002 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2002).
91. See Ann E. Carlson, Federalism, Preemption, and Greenhouse Gas Emissions, 37 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 281, 283 (2003) (noting that the California bill may be preempted by multiple
federal statutes).
92. California's total renewable energy production (defined as wind, solar, geothermal,
biomass, and small hydroelectric) increased from approximately five gigawatt hours in 1975 to
over thirty gigawatt hours in 2005, with the largest absolute increases happening in geothermal
and biomass. ARTHUR H. ROSENFELD, CAL. ENERGY COMM'N, CALIFORNIA PROGRESS IN ENERGYEFFICIENT BUILDINGS: THE LONG VIEW: 1974 - 2030, at 60 (2008), available at

http://www.energy.ca.gov/2008publications/CEC-999-2008-018/CEC-999-2008-018.PDF. Through
2003, energy efficiency programs saved approximately forty thousand gigawatt hours of
electricity in California. Audrey B. Chang, Arthur H. Rosenfeld & Patrick K. McAuliffe, Energy
Efficiency in Californiaand the United States, in CLIMATE CHANGE SCIENCE AND POLICY 483
(Stephen H. Schneider et al. eds., 2009). Overall per capita electricity use has remained more or
less constant in California since the mid-1970s, compared to a fifty percent increase in that time
frame for the United States as a whole. Id. at 437.
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between forty and fifty percent of the total venture capital investment
in renewable energy/cleantech made in the United States. 93 California
registered the largest number of patents in the cleantech field in this
time frame as well. 94 This investment and research created jobs in the
state as well.95 While it is difficult to prove direct causation between
93.

See DAVID CHENG ET AL., CLEANTECH GRP. LLC, CALIFORNIA IN PERSPECTIVE: A

REVIEW OF STATE ENERGY POLICIES AND THEIR IMPACT ON HIGH GROWTH CLEANTECH MARKETS 3

(2010),
available
at
http://www.cleantech.com/wp-content/uploads/201 1/1 1/California-inperspective-state-energy-policy-cleantech.pdf ("California companies received 40% of all dollars
that have flowed into market categories related to AB 32."); THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, THE
CLEAN ENERGY ECONOMY: REPOWERING JOBS, BUSINESSES, AND INVESTMENTS ACROSS AMERICA
53 (2009), available at http://www.pewenvironment.orgluploadedFiles/PEG/Publications/Report/
Clean%20Energy%2OEconomy.pdf (concluding that California received fifty-two percent, or
$6,580,426,908, in cleantech venture capital between 2006 and 2008). The next closest state was
Massachusetts at $1,278,462,000. Id.; see also AIR RES. BD., CAL. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
CALIFORNIA'S CLIMATE PLAN (2011), available at http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/cleanenergy/
clean_fs2.pdf ("In 2009, while other sectors saw little or no investment, the clean technology
sector in California received $2.1 billion, 60% of the total in North America. Venture capital
investments in the Golden State totaled nearly $6.6 billion from 2006 to 2008, about five times
more than our nearest competitor, and more than all other states combined."). Recently, some of
this cleantech investment has been moving away from energy production and toward
technological efforts to manage behavior and reduce carbon emissions. See Claire Cain Miller, In

Clean Tech, Venture Capital Looks for Problem-Solvers, N.Y. TIMES,

Oct. 25, 2011,

http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/26/business/energy-environment/in-clean-tech-venture-capitallooks-for-problem-solvers.html (asserting that it is possible to have a major impact on an
individual's carbon footprint by recreating business models and behaviors).
94. From 1999 to 2008, California companies registered 1,401 patents, representing 16.7
percent of total U.S. patents. THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, supra note 93, at 35 exhibit 15. The
next closest state, New York, registered 909 patents during that period, representing 10.8
percent of total U.S. patents. Id.; see also Jerry Hirsch, California Leads Venture Funding for
Electric Vehicle Technology, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 7, 2011, 1:56 PM), http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/
technology/2011/12/electric-vehicles-venture-funding-jobs.html (reporting on study that finds
California leading in venture capital investment and patents related to electric vehicles).
95.
Estimates vary depending on how different studies define the category of renewable
energy or cleantech. A study by The Pew Charitable Trusts, using conservative assumptions
about the size of the cleantech industry, found that between 1998 and 2007, the number of jobs
in cleantech in California rose 6.74 percent, from 116,441 to 125,390, providing about 16.3
percent of the total number of cleantech jobs in the United States; the next highest was Texas at
55,646. THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, supra note 93, at 8 exhibit 1. Another study found that
"core green energy jobs" in California increased from one hundred and eleven thousand in 1995
to one hundred and seventy-four thousand in 2009, an increase of 56 percent. NEXT 10, MANY
SHADES OF GREEN: REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION AND TRENDS IN CALIFORNIA'S GREEN ECONOMY 9
(2011),
available
at
http://www.next10.org/next10/publications/pdfl2011_ManyShadesofGreenFINAL.pdf. A third study from the Brookings Institution found that California had
30,321 cleantech jobs in 2010-this was the most of any state in the country, accounted for 16
percent of all cleantech jobs in the United States, and represented an increase from 17,386 jobs
in 2003. BROOKINGS INST., SIZING THE CLEAN ECONOMY: A NATIONAL AND REGIONAL CLEAN JOBS
ASSESSMENT app. at 5 (2011), available at http://www.brookings.edul-/media/Files/
Programs/Metro/clean economy/0713_cleaneconomy-ex.appendix2.pdf. Other studies provided
estimates of total green jobs in California in 2006 of between forty-four thousand and seventythree thousand. CAROL ZABIN & ANDREA BUFFA, UNIV. OF CAL. BERKELEY CTR. FOR LABOR
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California's history of strong public support for renewable energy and
the state's leadership in renewable energy investment and jobs, many
observers have relied on the close connection between the two to argue
for a causal linkage. 96
Strategic choices and direct investments by existing energy
companies in response to this policy landscape are also important.
Changes in rate-regulation strategies in California in the 1970s led
the major investment-owned utilities to focus their investments more
on energy conservation than on building new power plants,97 and later
renewable portfolio standards encouraged them to invest in renewable
energy projects over new fossil fuel generation.98 As a result, investorowned utilities such as PG&E opposed Proposition 23, showing the

RESEARCH & EDUC., ADDRESSING THE EMPLOYMENT IMPACTS OF AB 32, CALIFORNIA'S GLOBAL
WARMING SOLUTIONS ACT 2, 24 (2009), available at http://Iaborcenter.berkeley.edulgreenjobs/
index.shtml. For other claims as to the job benefits of renewable energy in California, see Hunter

L. Lovins, Climate Capitalism: The Business Case for Climate Protection,28 PACE ENVTL. L. REV.
735, 763-64 (2010) (documenting the increase in clean-sector jobs in California), and Marc
Lifsher, CaliforniaHas a Quarter of Solar Jobs, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 17, 2011, http://articles.latimes
.com/2011/oct/17/business/la-fi-solar-jobs-20111017 (reporting on study claiming that California
had twenty-five percent of all solar jobs in the United States in 2011). Clean energy jobs may
come at the expense of other energy jobs in the oil and gas industries, and the total number of
net jobs created by green energy is difficult to calculate. See Matthew L. Wald, Solar Power
Industry Falls Short of Hopes in Job Creation, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 2011, http://www.nytimes
.com/2011/10/26/business/energy-environment/in-terms-of-jobs-solar-energy-lacks-power.html
(suggesting that job growth in one energy sector may offset employment in another sector).
However, even if the jobs are simply transferred from another industry to clean energy, that shift
nonetheless will change the political landscape in an important way.
96. See, e.g., PATRICK R. BURTIS ET AL., NATURAL RES. DEF. COUNCIL, CREATING THE
CALIFORNIA CLEANTECH CLUSTER 29 (2004), available at http://www.nrdc.org/air/energy/
cleantech/cleantech.pdf (finding that, of twenty-five cleantech investors surveyed, seventy-nine
percent said California's public policy is a prominent factor in their cleantech investment
decisions, and ninety-one percent said a proenvironmental public policy stance can be a driver in
bringing new businesses and investments to the state); CHENG ET AL., supranote 93, at 5 (finding
a strong correlation between state cleantech policies and cleantech investment); JAMES STACK ET
AL., E2, CLEANTECH VENTURE CAPITAL: How PUBLIC POLICY HAS STIMULATED PRIVATE
INVESTMENT 24-25 (2007), available at http://www.e2.org/ext/doc/ CleantechReport2007.pdf
(finding that, of forty-one cleantech investors surveyed, eighty-four percent believed that
proactive environmental public policy can be a driver in attracting new cleantech businesses and
jobs to a state or region, sixty-five percent said state renewable portfolio standards had been
important or critical to investment decisions, and sixty-nine percent cited California as having
done the best job of encouraging cleantech startup companies); Janet Laughlin Sawin, The Role
of Government in the Development and Diffusion of Renewable Energy Technologies: Wind
Power in the United States, California, Denmark, and Germany, 1970-2000, at 366-90 (Sept.
2001) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Tufts University) (on file with author) (concluding that
public policy was central to the rise of wind-energy development in California).
97. See supra notes 67-73 and accompanying text (discussing investments made by
utilities to comply with existing regulations).
98. E.g., S.B. 1078, 2002 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2002).
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importance of significant investments in shaping the political
responses of economic actors to future policy changes. 99
Putting the parts together, we find a history of energy
legislation that supported the creation of a renewable energy industry
as well as encouraged other major energy industries in the state (e.g.,
oil and gas companies and electricity utilities) to make significant
investments to adjust toward a lower-carbon future. That in turn led
the energy industry groups to sit out the campaign over Proposition 23
or even oppose the initiative. The lack of in-state support for
Proposition 23 not only handed opponents a golden sound bite for
campaign ads and might have driven low-information voters away
from supporting the initiative, but it also may have discouraged any
split within the Democratic Party over climate change policy, in
contrast to the debate at the federal level. This understanding of the
campaign shows the importance of using legal tools (whether
regulations, subsidies, or taxes) to shape and build politically and
economically powerful interest groups that can push for, or at least
not resist, further policy efforts in the future.100 In other words,
Proposition 23 provides an example of the importance of strategically
thinking about the dynamic impacts of legislation in shaping the
future political landscape such that further policy changes are more
feasible.
Some additional support for this view comes from comparing
the interest group landscape in 2006, when AB 32 was enacted, and
2010, when the Proposition 23 campaign occurred. For many
California business interests, their neutrality in the Proposition 23
campaign came after strongly opposing the initial enactment of AB 32
four years earlier and other, prior energy legislation. The California
Chamber of Commerce had fought the enactment of both AB 32 as
99. See PATASHNIK, supra note 5, at 31-33, 169 (noting the importance of investment in
determining political outcomes); id. at 126, 150 (illustrating the importance of investment in
determining policy dynamics through examples ranging from airline deregulation to the acid
rain cap-and-trade program); Saul Levmore, Interest Groups and the Problem with
Incrementalism, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 815, 819-27 (2010) (noting a similar dynamic); see also R.
Shep Melnick, Strange Bedfellows Make Normal Politics:An Essay, 9 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F.
75, 89-90 (1998) (noting that investments made by businesses to comply with regulations create
incentives for these firms to advocate strict enforcement to gain a market advantage).
100. See PATASHNIK, supra note 5, at 28-29 (noting the importance of economic forces in
determining the success of policy changes, and the importance of "policy feedback," in which
policy changes alter the political landscape and so make future policy changes more or less
likely). Patashnik uses the term "creating constituencies" to refer to the use of policy changes to
create constituencies that will fight to protect prior changes or push for future ones. Id. at 30; see
also Carlson, supra note 5, at 1136 (noting how industry groups that benefit from regulation can
push for further regulation).
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well as AB 1493 in 2002.101 Chevron and an important regional oil
trade association, the Western States Petroleum Association, opposed
AB 32, but neither contributed to the Proposition 23 campaign. 102
While there may have been multiple reasons for the change in
position, including a strategic calculation that the ballot initiative was
a losing proposition not worth investing in compared to lobbying in the
legislature, 103 another possibility is that investments made by
California firms in the wake of AB 32 in order to comply with the law
made further resistance unattractive. 104
II. IMPLICATIONS FOR CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY AND
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

If the defeat of Proposition 23 is more than just a story of
ideology and partisanship, then it has important implications for the
future of U.S. climate change policy specifically, and environmental
law more generally. Proposition 23 helps us understand the
importance of law as a tool to shape the economic and political
landscape in a dynamic way that affects future policy choices.105
101. See Felicity Barringer, Officials Reach California Deal to Cut Emissions, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 31, 2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/08/31/washington/31warming.html (noting that the
California Chamber of Commerce led the opposition to emissions controls); Hanemann, supra
note 9, at 10, 20-21 (discussing the role of the California Chamber of Commerce in the legislative
process).
102. Oil Industry Warns California Climate Bill May Slash Fuel Production, ENERGY
WASHINGTON WEEK, May 10, 2006 (describing the Western State Petroleum Association's
opposition to AB 32); A.C. Thompson & Sonya Hubbard, Oil Slick, CTR. FOR INVESTIGATIVE
REPORTING (Apr. 23, 2008), http://cironline.org/reports/oil-slick-2168 (describing Chevron's
opposition to AB 32); CaliforniaProp. 23 - Campaign Contributions- Nov. 2010, supra note 15
(providing a list of all Prop 23. campaign contributions).
103. Additionally, California oil companies may have been concerned that supporting
Proposition 23 might have angered important Democratic political leaders and Governor
Schwarzenegger. These political leaders might have then pushed for other policies (such as
imposing a severance tax on oil and gas production in California) that might have been even
more harmful to the industry's interests than AB 32.
104. See supra note 99 and accompanying text (discussing the interplay between
incremental investment caused by regulations and political incentives).
105. See Brewster, supra note 5, at 252-58 (noting importance of dynamic analysis, and
applying the concept to the possibility that national climate change legislation will encourage the
growth of industry that will support international climate change policy). Many political
scientists have examined the dynamics of how policy is made and noted the potential for
feedback effects from policies. See PATASHNIK, supra note 5, at 3-11, 29 (providing overview of
the relevant literature, and listing key exceptions to the overall pattern); PAUL PIERSON,
POLITICS IN TIME: HISTORY, INSTITUTIONS, AND SOCIAL ANALYSIS 17-34 (2004) (providing
overview of the concept); Jacob S. Hacker & Paul Pierson, Business Power and Social Policy:
Employers and the Formation of the American Welfare State, 30 POL. & SoC'Y 277, 305-13 (2002)
(describing the importance of feedback effects in the context of Social Security policy history);
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The first priority in climate change policy should be to increase
the economic and political support for future climate legislation by
building the industry that has a political and economic stake in
expanding climate legislation. Following the lead of California, this
might mean an emphasis on options that are relatively
noncontroversial politically, such as subsidies and tax credits for
renewable energy, or renewable portfolio standards.1 06 (RPS have, in
fact, become quite popular at the state level around the country.)1 07
These options might encourage investment by companies into
renewable technologies (such that they have a stake in preserving or
expanding the scope for renewable energy) and the creation of jobs by
companies in the field (providing credibility for economic arguments
for renewable energy). Both factors seem to have played a significant
role in the Proposition 23 campaign.
Paul Pierson, Not Just What, but When: Timing and Sequence in Political Processes, 14 STUD.
AM. POL. DEV. 72, 74-79 (2000) (overview of the concept). Political scientist Eric Patashnik has
studied how policy changes fare after enactment, and how the structure of those policy changes
affects the likelihood of whether those policy changes will be sustained or reversed. PATASHNIK,
supra note 5, at 2-15, 176-80; see also Daryl J. Levinson, Parchment and Politics: The Positive
Puzzle of ConstitutionalCommitment, 124 HARv. L. REV. 658, 687-88 (2011) (noting possibility of
"[p]ositive political feedback").
106. A number of think tanks and policy analysts have argued for a reframing of U.S. and
global climate policy around subsidies for research and development in clean energy in order to
inspire innovation for low-cost clean energy in the future. See, e.g., JOSH FREED ET AL., THIRD
WAY, JUMPSTARTING A CLEAN ENERGY REVOLUTION WITH A NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF ENERGY 1-2
(2009), available at https://docs.google.com/viewer?url=http%3A%2F%2Fthebreakthrough.org
%2Fblog%2FJumpstartingCleanEnergySept_09.pdf (advocating research and development to
drive a clean-energy revolution); STEVEN F. HAYWARD ET AL., POST-PARTISAN POWER: HOW A
LIMITED AND DIRECT APPROACH TO ENERGY INNOVATION CAN DELIVER CLEAN, CHEAP ENERGY,

ECONOMIC PRODUCTIVITY AND NATIONAL PROSPERITY 8-9 (2010), available at http://
thebreakthrough.org/blog/2010/10/postpartisan-power.shtml
(pushing
for comprehensive
investment in clean energy and energy-innovation education); GWYNN PRINS ET AL., INST. FOR
Sc., INNOVATION, & SOc., UNIV. OF OXFORD, THE HARTWELL PAPER: A NEW DIRECTION FOR
CLIMATE POLICY AFTER THE CRASH OF 2009, at 19-21 (2010), available at http://
eprints.lse.ac.uk/27939/ (supporting clean-energy investment to create positive political feedback
for climate action); MATTHEW STEPP ET AL., INFO. TECH. & INNOVATION FOUND., TEN PRINCIPLES
FOR CREATING A NEW U.S. CLEAN ENERGY POLICY 2-3 (2011), available at http://www
.itif.org/publications/ten-principles-creating-new-us-clean-energy-policy
(advocating innovation
investment to reduce the cost of producing clean energy); Michael Shellenberger et al., Fast,
Clean & Cheap: Cutting Global Warming's Gordian Knot, 2 HARV. L. & POL'Y REV. 93, 94 (2008)
(advocating clean-energy infrastructure). Many of these emphasize the relative political
feasibility of subsidies in comparison to proposals such as carbon taxes or cap-and-trade that
could substantially increase energy costs for consumers. See, e.g., HAYWARD ET AL., supra, at 7 &
n.13 (noting broad public support for investment in innovative energy technologies);
Shellenberger et al., supra, at 100-01 (noting public opposition to high energy costs).

107. See Cinnamon Carlarne, Notes from a Climate Change Pressure-Cooker: Sub-Federal
Attempts at Transformation Meet National Resistance in the USA, 40 CONN. L. REV. 1351, 136667 (2008) (discussing state efforts to combat climate change).
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There are limits to the effectiveness of many of these tools. A
problem with subsidies for renewable fuels is that they will not
necessarily lead to a drop in the consumption of nonrenewables, given
the very low cost of production for many fossil fuels.108 This point has
been a major critique of proposals that rely exclusively on subsidies
and tax credits to advance climate change policy; these critics argue
that there is no substitute for raising the price of carbon.109 But if we
see subsidies and tax credits as an intermediate step designed to build
political and economic support for future regulatory measures, then
the tension between subsidies and increasing the price of carbon
disappears over the medium term.
The actual use of a policy not as an end in itself, but instead as
a way to achieve future policy progress, is not novel. There are historic
precedents for policymakers consciously attempting to build private
industry so as to build political support for policy goals. For instance,
the Atomic Energy Commission after World War II consciously
adopted a course of supporting the growth of a commercial nuclear
power industry in order to create a powerful interest group that could
provide support for the agency (particularly in its efforts to remain
independent of the military) and for the growth of atomic energy in
the United States.110 The Commission was successful in inspiring
private industry to build dozens of nuclear power plants in the late
1960s and early 1970s despite the economic and safety risks of the

108. This is related to the "green paradox" in which carbon regulation may result in
accelerated extraction of fossil fuels. See Hans-Werner Sinn, Public Policies Against Global
Warming, 15 INT'L TAX & PUB. FIN. 360, 380-82 (2008) (arguing that, in the absence of
constraints on fossil fuel suppliers, carbon taxes aimed at reducing demand may actually
increase the pace of global warming).
109. See POOLEY, supra note 69, at 296 (quoting a leading climate activist as saying that a
cap on carbon "has to be the litmus test of a good climate bill"); Carolyn Fischer & Richard G.

Newell, Environmental and Technology Policies for Climate Mitigation, 55 J. ENVTL. ECON. &
MGMT. 142, 142-44 (2008) (concluding that subsidies as a stand-alone tool are inefficient and
costly); Stephen H. Schneider & Lawrence H. Goulder, Achieving Low-Cost Emissions Targets,
389 NATURE 13, 13 (1997) (concluding that taxes are superior to subsidies in achieving climate
policy goals). But see Daron Acemoglu et al., The Environment and Directed Technical Change,
102 AM. ECON. REV. 131, 133 (2012) (developing model that indicates that subsidies may be
economically efficient for developing renewable energy in combination with a carbon tax).
110. See BRIAN BALOGH, CHAIN REACTION: EXPERT DEBATE AND PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN
AMERICAN COMMERCIAL NUCLEAR POWER 1945-75, at 60-119 (1991) (chronicling the symbiosis
of the commercial nuclear power energy industry and the Atomic Energy Commission, and
discussing this duo's consequent influence on congressional policymaking).
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new technology,"1 and the nuclear power industry has become a
powerful interest group in the energy policy arena.
A. The Benefits of Strategically Using Interest Groups to Build
Environmental Law
The notion that interest groups may interact with political
structures in order to advance particular policy agendas is, of course,
hardly a new one in law or political science. A classic example of the
concept is the "iron triangle," in which a powerful economic interest
group aligns with a sympathetic administrative agency and a
sympathetic congressional committee to entrench specific policy goals
in the political process.112 The traditional academic attitude toward
the interaction between powerful economic interests and political
structures has been negative: "iron triangles" have generally been
portrayed in the literature as skewing the policy process away from
the public interest (however defined) in favor of the rich and
powerful.113
This is equally true in the context of environmental law.
Writing in the field is deeply concerned about the risk of "agency
capture," in which powerful political interests capture and subvert
administrative agencies (perhaps with the help of Congress).114
Capture results in a diversion of those agencies from their proper
statutory tasks and ineffective implementation of environmental
policy, contrary to the desires of the majority of the public." 5
Some commentators-many with economics backgrounds, and
generally falling into the camp of "free market environmentalism"-

111. See id.at 177-220 (describing how pressure from nuclear scientists created the impetus
for the development of nuclear reactors despite apparent problems related to safety and economic
viability).
112. See id. at 62-63 (providing overview of the "iron triangle" concept).
113. Id. at 64 ("Much of the scholarly literature on iron triangles is critical. It compares this
style of governing to a more idealized pluralist model and finds time and time again that the
common good has been sacrificed for narrower achievements.").
114. See, e.g., Biber, supra note 54, at 40-42 & n.141 (asserting that, as public choice theory
suggests, regulated industries organize in opposition to effective regulation); Michael Blumm,

Public Choice Theory and the Public Lands: Why Multiple Use Failed, 18 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV.
405, 406-08 (1994) (discussing how environmental regulations have failed due to pressure from

local industry); Daniel A. Farber, Taking Slippage Seriously: Noncompliance and Creative
Compliance in Environmental Law, 23 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 297, 297-300 (1999) (discussing
how industry noncompliance is a barrier to effective environmental regulation).
115. See, e.g., Biber, supra note 54, at 41-42 (noting that industry resistance causes agency
inaction); Farber, supra note 114, at 319-20 (noting that lack of transparency provides an
opportunity to stymie agency action).
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carry this critique even further. They argue that environmental
nongovernmental organizations should be seen as interest groups like
any other, seeking their own ends and goals (often not congruent with

the public interest).116 They condemn the "Baptist and bootlegger"
alliances that these organizations have developed with industry to
advance environmental legislation and regulation.117 The argument is
that the alliances result in suboptimal regulatory systems that reduce
overall social welfare by distorting incentives and imposing barriers to
entry, and that also may not achieve the highest level of
environmental quality. 118
116. See, e.g., Michael S. Greve, Introduction: Environmental Politics Without Romance, in
ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS: PUBLIC COSTS, PRIVATE REWARDS 1, 8-9 (Michael S. Greve & Fred L.
Smith, Jr. eds., 1992) (arguing that environmental groups defend less efficient "command and
control" regulation because such a system "provide[s] substantial organizational and financial
benefits for those groups"); Marc K. Landy & Mary Hague, The Coalition for Waste: Private
Interests and Superfund, in ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS: PUBLIC COSTS, PRIVATE REWARDS, supra,
at 67, 74-77 (arguing that environmental groups support existing federal hazardous waste
liability laws because they "promote ... [their] broader political agenda" that is disconnected
from environmental quality).
117. "Baptist and Bootlegger" refers to Prohibition, when Baptists allied with bootleggers to
support strict prohibition laws. Baptists were motivated by their opposition to legal alcohol sales,
while bootleggers favored strict enforcement of the prohibition to ensure continuation of their
illegal alcohol operations. See Jonathan Baert Wiener, On the Political Economy of Global
Environmental Regulation, 87 GEO. L.J. 749, 760 (1999) (discussing historical alliance between
Baptists and Bootleggers). According to these commentators, environmental groups play the role
of Baptists, and regulated industry plays the role of bootleggers. See Bruce Yandle & Stuart
Buck, Bootleggers, Baptists, and the Global Warming Battle, 26 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 177, 18590 (2002) (describing the roles played by each group). The claim is that environmental regulation
that environmental groups pursue also produces benefits (e.g., raising the barriers to entry in an
industry) that regulated industry supports and seeks to advance. See Wiener, supra, at 754-61
(noting the benefits to both environmentalists and industry). From 2009 to 2010, opponents of a
federal climate bill explicitly accused environmentalists and industry of participating in a
"Baptist and Bootlegger" alliance to "transfer[] wealth from some companies and all consumers"
to selected companies. POOLEY, supra note 69, at 169; see also Yandle & Buck, supra,at 189-90
(arguing that the push for global climate regulation is primarily a result of efforts by industry to
achieve self-serving benefits).
118. See, e.g., Jonathan H. Adler, Clean Fuels, Dirty Air, in ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS:
PUBLIC COSTS, PRIVATE REWARDS, supra note 116, at 19, 23-29 [hereinafter Adler, Clean Fuels,
Dirty Air] (arguing that the clean fuels program in the 1990 Clean Air Act can be primarily
explained by corporate lobbying and that the result was an economically inefficient program with
relatively minor environmental benefits); Daniel F. McInnis, Ozone Layers and Oligopoly Profits,
in ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS: PUBLIC COSTS, PRIVATE REWARDS, supra note 116, at 129, 145-51
(arguing that global ozone treaties were primarily the result of corporate lobbying and that the
result was an expensive regulatory program to address a highly uncertain environmental
threat). But see Jonathan H. Adler, Rent Seeking Behind the Green Curtain, REGULATION, No. 4,
1996, at 26, 32 ("Just because environmental policy measures are often influenced by special
interest considerations does not mean they do not achieve environmental goals."); Bruce Yandle,
Public Choice at the Intersection of Environmental Law and Economics, 8 EUR. J. L. & ECON. 5,
21 (1999) (conceding that "only a few studies indicate that federal regulation may have actually
harmed the environment").
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There is therefore, on the surface, a deep tension between the
claim that Proposition 23 shows the utility of strategically building up
industry to create economic and political "facts-on-the-ground" that
will help advance environmental policy, and the many critiques that
entrenched interest groups produce suboptimal environmental policy.
But that is only on the surface.
There is certainly much truth to some of these concerns about
the possible ways that powerful interest groups can influence and
adjust the political and regulatory processes. There is ample evidence
(for instance) that regulated industry has systematic advantages in
the implementation process in environmental law. 119 However,
particularly for the "Baptist and bootlegger" critiques, there is an
important missing element to the analysis: an understanding of what
the appropriate counterfactual is for any comparison.
Any policy analysis is necessarily a relative one, a comparison
of various options to achieve social objectives. 120 The "Baptist and
bootlegger" critiques usually contend that some alternative policy
scheme (usually market mechanisms such as tradeable permits, taxes,
or even enhanced property rights) would achieve the same or better
environmental goals at lower overall social cost than traditional
regulatory structures (often called "command-and-control").1 2 1 These
critics then proceed from this comparison to assert that
environmentalists, by allying with industry to advance these

119. See, e.g., Wendy Wagner et al., Rulemaking in the Shade: An EmpiricalStudy of EPA's
Air Toxic Emission Standards, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 99, 100-04 (2011) (describing significant
imbalance in industry versus environmental participation in federal air toxic emissions
regulation).
120. See generally NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN
LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 3-13 (1994) (discussing how policy analysis necessarily

involves the overlooked importance of deciding which institution, of many possible alternatives,
makes the ultimate decision).
121. See, e.g., Adler, Clean Fuels, Dirty Air, supra note 118, at 19, 40-41 (arguing for
emission fee system to address pollution from automobiles); Greve, supra note 116, at 1, 8-9
(arguing for a regulatory system that mimics market incentives); Fred L. Smith, Jr., Conclusion:
Environmental Policy at the Crossroads, in ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS: PUBLIC COSTS, PRIVATE
REWARDS, supra note 116, at 177, 190-95 (arguing for return to primarily private management of
environmental risk); Roger Meiners & Bruce Yandle, Common Law and the Conceit of Modern
Environmental Policy, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 923, 961 (1999) (stating that they do not believe
that "command-and-control regulation by a central agency such as the EPA can be expected to
produce 'good' results by any measure (whether measured by economic efficiency, environmental
outcomes, or protection of personal freedom)"); Yandle, supra note 118, at 17-18 (arguing that
Baptist and bootlegger alliances lead to socially inefficient outcomes).
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traditional regulatory structures, have somehow "sold out" in a way
that is objectionable or socially suboptimal.122
The question is whether the "optimal" policy instruments are,
indeed, politically realistic. 123 If they are not, then the appropriate
comparison is not between traditional regulatory instruments and a
theoretical market-based or property system that might solve all of
our environmental and economic problems in a socially optimal way. 124
122. See, e.g., Greve, supra note 116, at 1, 8-9, 12-13 (asserting that environmental groups
are part of a broader movement to advance "corporate socialism" and rent seeking); Landy &
Hague, supra note 116, at 67, 74-77 (asserting that environmental groups, by allying with the
hazardous waste treatment industry, have "sacrifice[d] environmental benefits that could readily
be attained" if they only pushed for complete reform of U.S. hazardous waste liability laws);
Meiners & Yandle, supra note 121, at 961 (asserting that only those "who prefer to engage in
rent-seeking activities" should support the current environmental regulatory system and that
the EPA was not "actually ... created to protect the environment"); Yandle, supra note 118, at
12-13 (arguing that environmental groups care more about rent seeking than environmental

protection); Todd J. Zywicki, Baptists?: The PoliticalEconomy of EnvironmentalInterests Groups,
53 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 315, 317, 333-34, 340-41 (2002) (asserting that the failure of
environmental groups to pursue market-based regulatory strategies shows that their behavior is
"better explained by a model of private advantage" and the "pursuit of wealth, power, and the
personal gratification of environmental activities groups and their leaders"); Todd J. Zywicki,

Environmental Externalitiesand Political Externalities:The PoliticalEconomy of Environmental
Regulation and Reform, 73 TUL. L. REV. 845, 874 (1999) [hereinafter Zywicki, Environmental
Externalities] (asserting that environmental groups "are both direct and indirect beneficiaries of
the current command-and-control regime" and support it "even when it has negative
consequences to the environment when compared to more efficient regulatory mechanisms").
123. See, e.g., Landy & Hague, supra note 116, at 74-75 (asserting that improvements in
law "could readily be attained").
124. I am assuming that market-based mechanisms, tax schemes, or enhanced property
protections for environmental resources would, in fact, be more optimal economically than
traditional regulatory instruments. While that is certainly true in many circumstances, there are
also examples to the contrary. See, e.g., Maximilian Auffhammer & Ryan Kellogg, Clearing the

Air? The Effects of Gasoline Content Regulation on Air Quality, 101 AM. ECON. REV. 2687, 2688
(2011) (finding that a state program without market trading performed better than a federal
program with trading, and that the state program benefits exceeded costs); Meredith Fowlie,

Emissions Trading, Electricity Restructuring,and Investment in Pollution Abatement, 100 AM.
ECON. REV. 837, 863 (2010) (finding that command-and-control regulations of smog from large
stationary sources of air pollution were economically superior to cap-and-trade regulation).
In addition, many of the assertions that current environmental regulations are suboptimal
from an environmental perspective are quite speculative, or even groundless. For instance, one
critic claims that ozone regulation must have been the result of corporate lobbying because the
benefits of protecting the ozone layer (and reducing the production of chemicals believed to cause
the destruction of the ozone layer) are so uncertain. McInnis, supra note 118, at 129, 150-51. Of
course, almost all environmental regulation involves some level of uncertainty, so this argument
would counsel against almost all regulation. Moreover, ex post, it appears that the benefits from
ozone regulation have been enormous. See Wiener, supra note 117, at 773 (noting that the ozone
treaty "may well have saved the stratospheric ozone layer" even though it involved a coalition
between industry and environmental groups). Even the most famous example-a study of the
1977 Clean Air Amendments that showed how an alliance of environmentalists and Eastern coal
producers combined to impose a costly air pollution control standard on power utilities-can only
argue that stricter environmental standards might have been imposed in a hypothetical,
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Instead, the appropriate comparison is between politically feasible
traditional regulatory instruments and the even more politically
feasible option of doing nothing about the environmental problems in
the first place.125 In these circumstances, it almost always appears
alternative world where the political environment produced different outcomes. The 1977
Amendments did not weaken the standards imposed in the 1970 Act in any way, but instead
traded off one set of possible environmental gains for another. See BRUCE A. ACKERMAN &
WILLIAM T. HASSLER, CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR 38-41, 44-65 (1981) (noting how the alignment of
political forces in Congress scuttled attempts to create more effective clean air regulations, while
discussing how a hypothetical, ideal regulatory agency would have sought to address air
pollution) id. at 90 n.*, 93 (noting how any health benefits from rejecting the compromise would
be offset by visibility and other pollution costs elsewhere). Indeed, the authors admitted that
they did not know how to create an administrative structure that would avoid the political
dynamics evidenced in the 1977 Amendments. See id. at 118 n.* (stating that authors do not
"presently know how to design an expert agency of the kind hypothesized").
There are other weaknesses in much of the Baptist and bootlegger literature. It cannot
explain the appearance of much of modern environmental law, since industry did not advocate
for the enactment of the initial statutes in the early 1970s. See Wiener, supra note 117, at 756
(concluding that rent seeking cannot offer a plausible explanation for the origin of environmental
law). The empirical evidence of much of the rent-seeking claims is thin. Melnick, supra note 99,
at 78 ("[Studies] do not demonstrate either that successful rent-seeking is common or that rentseekers can prevail without assistance from environmental groups or other broad-based
constituencies."); Wiener, supra note 117, at 757; Nathaniel 0. Keohane et al., The Positive
Political Economy of Instrument Choice in Environmental Policy 33 (Res. for the Future,
Discussion Paper No. 97-25, 1997), available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/56519071/12/
Generation-of-Rents-and-Erection-of-Entry-Barriers (noting that "there are no conclusive
empirical validations" of industry demand for command-and-control regulations). Some of the
studies relied upon in the literature are of dubious quality. See, e.g., Franklin G. Mixon, Jr.,
Public Choice and the EPA: Empirical Evidence on Carbon Emissions Violations, 83 PUB. CHOICE
127, 129-36 (1995) (study purporting to find political pressure on EPA to reduce findings of
greenhouse gas emissions violations from 1988 to 1990, but that appears to conflate carbon
monoxide, which has minimal greenhouse gas effects, with carbon dioxide); Meiners & Yandle,
supra note 121, at 955 (citing the Mixon study as one example from the "large body of empirical
work" that supports public choice critiques of environmental regulation in the global warming
context). Other studies have found only mixed evidence of effective rent seeking, even for
massive regulatory programs like the 1990 Clean Air Act amendments that created the acid rain
regulatory system. See Paul L. Joskow & Richard Schmalensee, The Political Economy of
Market-Based Environmental Policy: The U.S. Acid Rain Program, 41 J.L. & EcON. 37, 37-40
(1998).
125. See, e.g., DAVID G. VICTOR, GLOBAL WARMING GRIDLOCK 63-72 (2011) (concluding that
national climate change policies will inevitably involve relatively inefficient, but politically
sustainable, direct regulations that mask the cost of climate policy); Robert W. Hahn, The
Political Economy of Environmental Regulation: Towards a Unifying Framework, 65 PUB.
CHOICE 21, 40-42 (1990) (encouraging economists studying instrument choice to make the
comparisons between politically realistic regulatory programs and politically realistic tax
programs, which will require context-specific analysis); Barry Rabe et al., State Competition as a
Source Driving Climate Change Mitigation, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 33-34 (2005) (noting that
rent seeking or protectionist legislation will be more inefficient than an ideal outcome, but
whether it is ultimately bad for the environment or society "necessarily raises a question of
second-bests, and it is hard to say exactly whether the regulations that resulted were better than
the status quo, or indeed what status quo they should be compared to").
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that traditional regulation is the superior outcome to no regulation at
all, 126 and environmental groups should hardly be faulted for making
temporary alliances with industry in order to advance environmental
policy, even if particular elements of the resulting regulatory policy
can be criticized as suboptimal compared to some ideal benchmark. 127
126. See, e.g., Cass Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Default Principles, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1651, 1657
(2001) (stating that command-and-control regulation "appears, by most accounts, to survive costbenefit balancing, producing aggregate benefits in the trillions of dollars, well in excess of the
aggregate costs" and noting that the EPA estimated the costs of the Clean Air Act to be thirtyseven billion dollars and the benefits to be over one trillion dollars, with outside estimates
showing a benefit-cost ratio of three to one). John Graham has noted:
In each year from 1992 through 2006, the estimated benefits of major rules [by the
Office of Management and Budget] exceeded the estimated costs. The total benefits of
major rules during this period exceeded the total costs by more than 300%. And from
2001 to 2006, the average annual benefits from major rules were more than double
the rate of the previous eight years. If these ex ante estimates are accurate, they
suggest that new federal regulations have contributed to a substantial improvement
in social welfare in the United States.
John D. Graham, Saving Lives Through Administrative Law and Economics, 157 U. PA. L. REV.
395, 482 (2008); see also ACKERMAN & HASSLER, supra note 124, at 117 ("If faced with a choice
between the bastardized Clean Air Act of today or the pathetically weak legal regime prevailing
before the first Earth Day, no doubt we would settle for what we have."); Robert W. Crandall et
al., Clearingthe Air: EPA's Self-Assessment of Clean-Air Policy, REGULATION, No. 4, 1996, at 35,
37 ("No one doubts that even the most crude and inefficient form of pollution control at an
elemental level is likely to produce benefits in excess of costs."); Nicholas Z. Muller et al.,
EnvironmentalAccounting for Pollution in the United States Economy, 101 AM. ECON. REV. 1649,
1671-73 (2011) (arguing that significant additional stringent regulation for coal-fired power
plants would be easily justified from a cost-benefit perspective). The criticisms of inefficiencies in
environmental regulation are generally that we might get equivalent or better regulation for less
cost, not that the status quo overall produces more costs than benefits. See Sunstein, supra, at
1657-60 (identifying the central problems that cost-benefit analysis seeks to address as "poor
priority setting, excessively costly tools, and inattention to the unfortunate side-effects of
regulation").
127. See, e.g., DAVID VOGEL, TRADING UP: CONSUMER AND ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION IN
A GLOBAL ECONOMY 21-22, 260-61 (1995) (describing how Baptist and bootlegger alliances can
make environmental regulation more feasible); James M. Buchanan & Gordon Tullock, Polluters'
Profits and PoliticalResponse: Direct Controls Versus Taxes, 65 AM. ECON. REV. 139, 142-43, 147
(1975) (noting industry's preference for regulation over taxes to address environmental harms,
and encouraging economists to understand the relevant political realities and consider
"institutional arrangements" that make taxes more palatable or even to consider regulatory
choices); E. Donald Elliott et al., Toward a Theory of Statutory Evolution: The Federalizationof
Environmental Law, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 313, 326 (1985) (noting that the structure of collective
action challenges in environmental problems "creates a strong incentive for [political actors] to
pursue a less than ideal outcome in order to avoid an even less desirable result"); Rabe et al.,
supra note 125, at 34-37 (arguing that protectionist environmental legislation can be an
important tool for overcoming collective action failures and result in improvements in social
welfare); Wiener, supra note 117, at 750 ("[A] coalition of both civic republicans and parochial
rent-seekers may be a necessary precondition to the enactment of key environmental laws."); id.
at 758 ("[T]he enactment of apparently skewed legislation might reflect the best outcome
possible, not the role of dastardly special interests."); No Perfect Programme, THE ECONOMIST,
http://www.economist.com/blogs/democracyinamerica/2011/10/green-jobs-stimulus (Oct. 14, 2011)
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Thus, once we understand that environmental policy is truly
about what is possible in the political landscape that we live in (not in
the political landscape that we wish we lived in), we have to come to
terms with the hard reality that there will always be entrenched
interest groups in existence, distorting policy outcomes. The question
is then whether we seek to fight every entrenched interest group in
order to achieve optimal policy, or whether instead we come to terms
with the world that we live in and ally, co-opt, or otherwise use
entrenched interest groups to make environmental policy better on the
margins. 128 A strategic interpretation of the Proposition 23 campaign
shows a way to cultivate the interest group landscape so as to improve
climate policy in the near term, and in the real world, by building up
interest groups for whom advancing climate policy is in their own best
interests.
B. FurtherImplications:The Scientist Myth, the Importance of
Efficiency in Climate Change Policy, and the Role of States in Climate
Change Policy
There are three ways in which a strategic, dynamic role for
U.S. climate policy both contrasts with and contributes to themes that
are present in the law and policy literature on climate change. The
first is what climate policy scholar David Victor calls the "scientist
myth," a myth sometimes found in the policy debates: if climate
scientists simply produced additional climate science, that would
further reduce the uncertainty over climate forecasts; or if scientists,
policymakers, activists, or scholars all just asserted loudly and
forcefully enough that the "science of climate change is settled" and
properly educated the public about the science, then the political
debate would move toward a focus on which solutions to climate
(arguing that any energy policy will necessarily involve compromise with powerful political
interests).
128. For instance, the environmental groups that compromised with Eastern coal producers
in the 1977 Clean Air Act amendments did so to protect other gains in that legislation, such as
restrictions on air pollution in areas that already met air quality standards (the Prevention of
Significant Deterioration ("PSD') program), restrictions that otherwise might have been a target
for the powerful coal industry. The environmental groups might have also concluded that only so
many political battles could be won with so many interest groups, and a strategic alliance with
the coal industry would protect the PSD program that was the most important goal. See
ACKERMAN & HASSLER, supra note 124, at 31, 36, 41, 44-47 (noting the political threat that the
coal industry posed, the importance of the PSD program to environmental groups, and the
powerful array of interests opposed to PSD). Indeed, when the environmental groups backed
away from the compromise in the administrative process, the coal industry was able to prevent
any significant change to that compromise. Id. at 98-103.
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change should be adopted, rather than whether any solutions should
be adopted. 129 The problem with this approach is that in climate
science (as in many other areas of environmental science), the level of
uncertainty that is politically significant will directly correlate with
the level of conflict over the policy question at issue. 130 As the stakes
for any individual policy question increase, various actors in the
political process will have increased incentives to scrutinize the
relevant science and deconstruct it by identifying the inevitable
assumptions and inferences that are needed to make connections
between scientific results and policy answers.11 Those assumptions
and inferences are inevitable because the complexity and dynamism of
our natural environment mean that it is often the case that science
cannot provide conclusive answers to the policy questions that most
interest us.1 32 This is particularly true in a complex field such as
climate science.
The key, then, to getting traction in the debates over climate
policy, and to moving toward the adoption of effective policy solutions
to the problem of climate change, is not to focus on resolving
uncertainty or trying to browbeat political opponents into conceding
that there is no uncertainty. The key is instead to shape the economic
and political landscape so that there is less reason for various actors to
contest the science and emphasize the inevitable uncertainty in the
science. 133 The campaign over Proposition 23 did not focus on whether
129. See VICTOR, supra note 125, at 42 (noting that this belief "leads policy advocates (and
their opponents) to invest heavily in finding a scientific consensus (or undermining it)"); see also
Matthew C. Nisbet, Public Opinion and Participation, in OXFORD HANDBOOK ON CLIMATE
CHANGE AND SOCIETY 355, 362 (John S. Dryzek et al. eds., 2011) (noting "popular assumption"
that improved public knowledge will result in increased public support for climate change); Kari
Marie Norgaard, Climate Denial: Emotion, Psychology, Culture, and Political Economy, in
OXFORD HANDBOOK ON CLIMATE CHANGE AND SOCIETY, supra, at 399, 400-01 ("For nearly
twenty years the majority of research on climate change from both disciplines presumed
information was the limiting factor in public non-response."); Ravkin, supra note 81 ("[F]or far
too long climate campaigners have had a tendency to speak of the science pointing to rising risks
from building emissions of greenhouse gases and their favored solutions in a single breath.").
130. See Eric Biber, Which Science? Whose Science? How Scientific Disciplines Can Shape
Environmental Law, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 471, 482 (2012); Daniel Sarewitz, How Science Makes
Environmental Controversies Worse, 7 ENVTL. SCl. & POL'Y 385, 394-96 (2004).
131. Biber, supra note 130, at 533; Sarewitz, supra note 130, at 396.
132. Biber, supra note 130, at 476.
133. For instance, Victor notes that the key factor that lead the international community to
adopt stringent limitations on substances that deplete the ozone layer was not a scientific
consensus that the ozone layer was in danger or about the mechanisms by which the layer was
being degraded, but instead was changes in "underlying interests and abilities," specifically a
conclusion by the leading manufacturers of ozone-depleting substances that substitutes were
feasible and would be profitable. VICTOR, supra note 129, at 44-46, 220-21; see also RICHARD E.
BENEDICK, OZONE DIPLOMACY: NEW DIRECTIONS IN SAFEGUARDING THE PLANET 306-32 (1998).
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climate change was happening or not-surprisingly, not even the
proponents of the Proposition made that the focal point of their
campaign.134 The focus was on jobs and to some extent Californian
jingoism. Opponents did not need to convince Californians that
climate science was settled, because they did not need to rely on
arguments about climate science. If the cost of climate policy was low
(or in fact was a net gain for California), then whether or not a climate
catastrophe might occur in the future was not that important to
voters. 135
Another major element of the debate over climate change policy
has been a focus on which instrument-cap-and-trade, a carbon tax,
subsidies, or traditional "command-and-control" regulation-would be
most effective at this present time in leading the way to reducing
carbon emissions. Many, many trees have been sacrificed in debates
over the relative economic and political pros and cons of each of these
options.136 The economic side of these debates tends to be quite
134. See supra note 102. This was even as climate change skepticism reached new heights of
political prominence in the United States, particularly in the Republican Party.
135. Indeed, opposition primarily from out-of-state interests may have made even more
convincing the argument that AB 32 was good economically for Californians, since it implied that
interests in competing states (such as Texas) were afraid of what California was doing. Other
states that have enacted efforts to address climate change generally have also framed those
policies as low-cost, economically feasible choices. See BARRY G. RABE, STATEHOUSE AND
GREENHOUSE: THE EMERGING POLITICS OF AMERICAN CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY 29-31, 38, 50,

118-19 (2004) (stating that some states frame their policy reactions to climate change as a
response to an "economic development opportunity" or an "economic threat" and that states that
have enacted greenhouse gas strategies have tended to do so because they believe it is in their
economic interest); Barry G. Rabe, The Aversion to Direct Cost Imposition: Selecting Climate
Policy Tools in the United States, 23 GOVERNANCE 583, 592 (2010) ("A key element in their state
policy work was selecting climate policy tools that could be framed primarily as an economic
development enhancement. . . .").
136. See generally, e.g., Reuven S. Avi-Yonah & David J. Uhlmann, Combating Global
Climate Change: Why a Carbon Tax Is a Better Response to Global Warming than Cap and
Trade, 28 STAN. ENvTL. L.J. 3 (2009); Alex Rice Kerr, Why We Need a Carbon Tax, ENVIRONS:
ENVTL. L. & POL'Y J. 69 (2010) (arguing that a carbon tax presents the best alignment of
technology, capital, and policy to directly respond to the approaching energy and environmental
crisis); Roberta Mann, The Case for the Carbon Tax: How to Overcome Politics and Find our
Green Destiny, 39 ENvTL. L. REP. 10,118 (2009) [hereinafter Mann, The Case for the Carbon Tax]
(arguing that a carbon tax is the best regulatory approach but that significant impediments,
namely the United States's cultural aversion to taxes, must be overcome); Roberta Mann, To Tax
Carbon or Not to Tax Carbon - Is That the Question?, NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T, Summer 2009,
at 44 [hereinafter Mann, To Tax Carbon] (asserting that implementation of a carbon tax and capand-trade system will play an essential role in reducing carbon dioxide emissions); Robert R.
Nordhaus & Kyle Danish, Assessing the Options for Designing a Mandatory U.S. Greenhouse Gas
Reduction Program, 32 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 97 (2005) (evaluating four approaches to
regulation: upstream or downstream cap-and-trade, greenhouse gas tax, product standards, and
hybrid programs); Robert N. Stavins, A Meaningful U.S. Cap-and-Trade System to Address
Climate Change, 32 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 293 (2008) (proposing an upstream, economy-wide CO2
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sophisticated, trying to understand how different policy options will
dynamically affect the future of energy in the U.S. economy. 137 The
political side of these debates generally focuses more on what options
are more likely to pass right now, though there are some exceptions.138
In the case of California, a wide range of policy options has
been used to encourage the development of clean energy: subsidies,
tax breaks, regulatory mandates, and cap-and-trade.139 The campaign
over Proposition 23 did not turn on which particular climate
instruments had been adopted in the past forty years of energy policy
in California or which policy option the state Air Resources Board
might choose to implement AB 32. (In fact, AB 32 gave the Board
tremendous leeway in terms of the policy tools it could adopt, ranging
from traditional regulation to cap-and-trade to a carbon tax.) Again, if
a strategic interpretation of the Proposition 23 campaign is correct,
then what was important was that energy policy had generally been
aggressively pursued and had significantly altered the economic (and
therefore the political) landscape in the state. The details over which
policy option is more or less effective economically over the next forty
years may be far less important than ensuring that some significant
policy option, any significant policy option, is adopted.140 Similarly,
cap-and-trade system with gradual emissions reductions over time). Such debates are also
present in the public arena. See, e.g., POOLEY, supra note 69, at 338 (quoting op-ed by senior
Environmental Defense Fund staffer arguing for cap-and-trade over a carbon tax); id. at 362-63
(describing calls by New York Times op-ed columnist Tom Friedman for a carbon tax because of
simplicity); id. at 368-69 (presenting calls by a leading climate scientist for carbon tax over capand-trade).
137. See, e.g., Schneider & Goulder, supra note 109, at 13 (noting most economic
comparisons conclude that a carbon tax is superior).
138. See, e.g., Avi-Yonah & Uhlmann, supra note 136, at 45 (acknowledging political
resistance as a disadvantage of the carbon tax); Kerr, supra note 136, at 69, 94-95 (endorsing a
carbon tax despite the practical political challenge of enacting tax legislation); Mann, The Case
for the Carbon Tax, supra note 136, at 10,124-25 ("Politicians undoubtedly fear charges of
supporting higher taxes."); Nordhaus & Danish, supra note 136, at 161 (noting that political
acceptability is a major obstacle to a greenhouse gas tax); Stavins, supra note 136, at 351 ("[N]o
policy proposal should be ruled out on this basis, and it is conceivable that carbon taxes may be
politically feasible in future years ......"). Patashnik has briefly discussed that cap-and-trade
might be preferable to a carbon tax because the former creates incentives for industry to support
the policy after enactment, since industry has a stake in the new policy system, and that
industry might even push for further policy changes in the future as a result of those incentives.
PATASHNIK, supra note 5, at 179-80.
139. See infra Table 1. In October 2011, California's Air Resources Board adopted a cap-andtrade approach for implementing AB 32. See Julie Cart, CaliforniaBecomes the First State to
Adopt Cap-and-Trade Program, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 21, 2011, http://articles.latimes.com/2011
/oct/21/local/la-me-cap-trade-20111021.
140. The risk with seeking the optimal policy outcome is that the "perfect will become the
enemy of the good." See Daniel A. Farber, Climate Justice, 110 MICH. L. REV. 985, 989 (2012)
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while it is essential to ensure that a policy option is politically feasible
today, it may be essential to consider what policy options will best
succeed at encouraging future progress in the years to come.
The third major theme is the role of federalism in U.S. climate
policy. California's aggressive efforts to regulate greenhouse gas
emissions provoked a series of high-profile confrontations with the
federal government and regulated industry over whether California's
efforts were preempted by federal law.141 That in turn prompted some
significant debates among legal scholars as to whether state and local
efforts to deal with climate change are appropriate and/or
constitutional, a particularly important question for an issue that
seems inherently global.142 Those debates have identified a range of
rationales for state and local participation, from correcting regulatory
(reviewing ERIC A. POSNER & DAVID WEISBACH, CLIMATE CHANGE JUSTICE (2010)) (identifying
"the fallacy of the hypothetical alternative"). According to Farber:
This is a common type of argument: although it may be true that A would be better
than B, we should not adopt A because there might be some other hypothetical
alternative that would be superior to A. Yet, we are not told what these other
alternatives might be, whether implementation would actually be feasible, or that the
alternatives would be politically viable.

Id.; see also Robert W. Hahn, Climate Policy: SeparatingFact from Fantasy, 33 HARv. ENvTL. L.
REV. 557, 565, 590 (2009) (citing economists who argue for the pursuit of second-best efforts to
address climate change that are politically feasible, even if they are not economically ideal, and
arguing for possibly less efficient national-level climate change efforts as a second-best choice);

Democracy in America: Should Southerners Pay Higher Taxes than Yankees?, THE ECONOMIST
(June 24, 2011, 1:32 PM), http://www.economist.com/blogs/democracyinamerica/2011/06/
inequality-and-taxation (identifying the concept of "an objectively incoherent defence of powerful
interests: in the face of a pragmatically possible reform . . . an argument is invoked whose full
implications would require an even more thoroughgoing reform . . . which since the
thoroughgoing reform is a political non-starter results only in defeat of the pragmatic reform and
no other change. This is a pretty effective strategy for defending powerful interests . . . ."). Contra
Kerr, supra note 136, at 95 ("Politicians have a responsibility to resist lobbying pressure from the
private sector and convince their constituents to join them in doing what is right, not just what is
popular. Anything less is a failure of leadership in a period of crisis.").
141. See, e.g., DeShazo & Freeman, supra note 5, at 1521-22; Jody Freeman, The Obama

Administration's National Auto Policy: Lessons from the "Car Deal," 35 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV.
343, 349-52 (2011) (describing the enactment and ramifications of the California law).
142. See generally, e.g., David E. Adelman & Kirsten H. Engel, Reorienting State Climate
Change Policies to Induce Technological Change, 50 ARIz. L. REV. 835 (2008); William W. Buzbee,

State Greenhouse Regulation, Federal Climate Change Legislation, and the Preemption Sword, 1
SAN DIEGO J. CLIMATE & ENERGY L. 23 (2009); Carlson, supra note 86; Alice Kaswan,

Decentralizing Cap-and-Trade?The Question of State Stringency, 1 SAN DIEGO J. CLIMATE &
ENERGY L. 103 (2009). For arguments that subnational regulation is counterproductive, see
generally Brewster, supra note 5; Cary Coglianese & Jocelyn D'Ambrosio, Policymaking Under

Pressure: The Perilsof Incremental Responses to Climate Change, 40 CONN. L. REV. 1411 (2008);
Joseph Allan MacDougald, Why Climate Law Must Be Federal: The Clash Between Commerce
Clause Jurisprudenceand State Greenhouse Gas Trading Systems, 40 CONN. L. REV. 1431 (2008);
Jonathan B. Wiener, Think Globally, Act Globally: The Limits of Local Climate Change Policies,
155 U. PA. L. REV. 1961 (2007).
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failures at the federal level, 143 to providing room for democratic
expressions of subnational positions on climate change, 144 to allowing
for experimentation in the development of climate policies,145 to using
the threat of regulatory fragmentation to force industry to seek action
at a federal level. 146
A strategic interpretation of the Proposition 23 campaign helps
identify another rationale for allowing state and local participation in
climate policy: the possibility of developing industry at the state level
that could, in the future, push for policy changes in other states or at
the federal level. The renewable energy industry in California, for
example, could push for federal legislation that would increase both
the level and geographic scale of regulatory or other policies that
support renewable energy.147 There is some evidence that this
dynamic is already playing out. The aggressive RPS standards in
California have encouraged the rapid development of renewable
energy in Oregon and Washington for export to California.148 This is a
bottom-up way of developing climate policy-constructing the interest

143. See, e.g., Buzbee, supra note 142, at 28-32 (listing the regulatory failure risks of
climate change legislation); Kaswan, supra note 142, at 114-15 (suggesting states "could directly
make up for the federal failure").
144. See, e.g., Kaswan, supra note 142, at 118-23 (offering democratic justifications for state
stringency).
145. E.g., Benjamin K. Sovacool, The Best of Both Worlds: EnvironmentalFederalism and the
Need for Federal Action on Renewable Energy and Climate Change, 27 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 397,
430-31 (2008) ("State action can provide opportunities for experimentation in designing policy,
as the simultaneous action of many states promotes competition and innovation.").
146. See Brewster, supra note 5, at 263-65 (arguing that the way state-level measures "can
generate a positive political dynamic to support further measures is by creating an industry
demand for a uniform regulatory standard"); DeShazo & Freeman, supra note 5, at 1504-16
(noting that industry will demand federal standards that preempt inconsistent state regulation);
Wiener, supra note 142, at 1974-75 ("A patchwork of inconsistent state regimes stimulates U.S.
federal action to harmonize national regulation.").
147. See DeShazo & Freeman, supra note 5, at 1510-11 & n.30 (describing how state efforts
to build up renewable energy industries might create interest groups that push for subsequent
federal legislation).
148. See Ted Sickinger, The Cost of Green: Huge Eastern Oregon Wind Farm Raises Big
Questions About State, Federal Subsidies, OREGON LIVE (Mar. 12, 2011, 1:04 PM),
http://www.oregonlive.com/politics/index.ssf/2011/03/post_20.html (noting that California buys
more than half of all wind power produced in the Pacific Northwest and is a major driver for the
establishment of renewable projects in those states); James Holman, Power-Hungry CaliforniaIs
Hot for the Northwest Clean Energy, OREGON LIVE (Aug. 24, 2008, 12:00 AM), http://www.
oregonlive.com/environment/index.ssf/2008/08/california-utilities-look-to-o.html
(same).
California policymakers have been aware of the potential for their efforts to shape other states'
policies and have seen that potential as an argument for California's efforts. Rabe, supra note
135, at 590.
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groups that would support climate policy at the federal level by
encouraging their growth at the state level. 149
III. RESPONDING TO OBJECTIONS: DEMOCRACY, SUBOPTIMAL
OUTCOMES, AND STRATEGIC OPPOSITION

There are at least three possible critiques of this approach: one
relates to its normative appeal, and the other two relate to its
effectiveness. First, this approach could be seen as calling for the
manipulation of the democratic process to address climate change,
something that might not be justifiable in a democratic system of
governance. Second, building up particular industries might result, in
the long run, in more harm than good to the cause of addressing
climate change. Third, those interest groups threatened by climate
change policy (e.g., oil, gas, and coal) might themselves recognize this
dynamic and therefore oppose any efforts to change the interest group
landscape in any way that might be potentially harmful to their
interests.
The first critique is that the strategic use of public policy to
nurture and grow interest groups in a way that affects the democratic
process might be seen as antidemocratic. Politicians and policymakers
develop policy in an effort to manipulate public opinion (by changing
the economic and political landscape that helps shape that opinion)
and also, by encouraging the growth of interest groups that might
skew the decisionmaking process, subvert the ability of the general
public to influence the political process. One problem with this
argument is that it implies that any public policy might be considered
antidemocratic because all public policy choices will inevitably affect
the interest group landscape and public opinion. 1 0

149. See VICTOR, supra note 125, at 242-45 (calling for a "bottom up" approach to
international climate policy that begins with individual agreements among particular countries).
An excellent example of this dynamic is the development of a multistate cap-and-trade carbon
emissions trading system in the northeastern United States. Economic pressures across state
lines (due to the nature of the electric grid and utility ownership patterns) strongly encouraged
many small states to enter into the trading system and auction the allowances, rather than give
them away. See Bruce Huber, How Did Reggie Do It?, 39 ECOLOGY L.Q. (forthcoming), available
("[Sitate legislatures have
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2018329
embraced auctions as a source of revenue to offset adverse rate effects."); see also Vivian E.

Thomson & Vicki Arroyo, Upside-Down Cooperative Federalism: Climate Change Policymaking
and the States, 29 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 54-61 (2011) (noting the possibility that state efforts might
inspire or encourage efforts in other states to pursue climate change policy).
150. Any taxation, spending, or regulatory program will create winners and losers and affect
the ability and desire of various members of the public to lobby the government going forward.
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But there is a more fundamental problem with this
antidemocratic critique in the specific context of climate change. The
impacts of greenhouse gas emissions within the United States are not
felt exclusively, or even predominantly, within the borders of the
United States. Greenhouse gas emissions will affect the lives and
livelihoods of billions of people around the world, given the globalcommons nature of climate change. And those billions of people have
absolutely no representation in the U.S. political process, despite the
potentially devastating effects that U.S. greenhouse gas emissions
might have on the citizens of countries such as Tuvalu, Bangladesh,
India, or sub-Saharan African countries, many of which are already
among the poorest in the world and which have contributed the least
to greenhouse gas emissions.151 Indeed, few seriously argue that there
is no obligation on the part of the United States and other developed
countries to address climate change in some way. There are, however,
significant debates about whether that aid should come in the context
of efforts to reduce (or mitigate) climate change in the future or to
assist poorer countries with adaptation, the size of the obligation, the
institutional means to fulfill it, etc. 152
Yet the costs and benefits of climate change mitigation and
adaptation will not likely fall uniformly across the planet, and many
have speculated that the United States will disproportionately reap
the benefits of greenhouse gas emissions while avoiding many of the
costs. 153 Given that distribution of costs and benefits, some observers

151. See, e.g., Robert Mendelsohn et al., The Distributional Impact of Climate Change on
Rich and Poor Countries, 11 ENV'T & DEV. ECON. 159, 173 (2006) ("Overall, the poor will suffer
the bulk of the damages from climate change .... .").
152. For arguments that developed countries owe an obligation to address climate change,
see generally Simon Caney, Climate Change and the Future.Discounting for Time, Wealth, and
Risk, 40 J. Soc. PHIL. 163 (2009); Simon Caney, Justice and the Distributionof Greenhouse Gas
Emissions, 5 J. GLOBAL ETHICS 125 (2009); Stephen M. Gardiner, Climate Justice, in OXFORD
HANDBOOK ON CLIMATE CHANGE AND SOCIETY, supra note 129, at 309, 314-15 (noting
"consensus" that developed nations have obligation to carry more of the burden to address
climate change); Henry Shue, Global Environment and International Inequality, 75 INT'L AFF.
531 (1999); Henry Shue, Subsistence Emissions and Luxury Emissions, 15 L. & POL'Y 39 (1993).
For a review of traditional arguments that an ethical obligation exists for developed countries to
address climate change that is skeptical, but that nonetheless concludes some obligation is owed,
see generally ERIC POSNER & DAVID WEISBACH, CLIMATE CHANGE JUSTICE (2010).
153. Cass R. Sunstein, The World vs. the United States and China? The Complex Climate
Change Incentives of the Leading Greenhouse Gas Emitters, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1675, 1677 (2008)
(noting that the United States "lack[s] a strong incentive to solve the problem"). But see Jody
Freeman & Andrew Guzman, Climate Change and U.S. Interests, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1531, 1600
(2009) (arguing that aggressive climate change action is in the best interests of the United
States, considering all costs and benefits).
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have expressed skepticism that the American political system will
ever seriously address climate change.15 4
Thus, climate change is a classic example of an
interjurisdictional pollution spillover in which the operation of the
political system at one level will lead to a both economically inefficient
and unjust outcome at another level-a situation that might justify
superseding the decisionmaking process of the suboptimal level,
whether democratic or not.155 If the strategic use of interest groups
might help advance productive climate change policy, we are left with
a tradeoff between any negative impacts on American democracy and
the economic costs and costs to justice of inaction on climate change.
Given the likely marginal democratic impacts of the strategic use of
interest groups and the potential stakes of climate change,156 it seems
that this trade-off weighs heavily against the antidemocratic
argument.
There is one additional reason to be skeptical of the
antidemocratic argument. If climate change does have significant
negative impacts on the economies and societies of countries around
the world, countries that have different cost-benefit analyses than the
United States, those countries might explore relatively affordable
actions that would allow them to unilaterally reduce the negative
effects of climate change. In fact, techniques do exist that would allow
a country such as India, Nigeria, or Brazil to "reset" the global
thermostat through what scientists call "geoengineering." Perhaps the
most plausible of these techniques would involve the injection of sulfur
aerosol particles into the upper atmosphere, where they would reflect
more of the sun's incoming light from the planet's surface (what
154. E.g., Sunstein, supra note 153, at 1700 (expressing uncertainty about whether the
United States will act).

155. See, e.g., Richard L. Revesz, The Race to the Bottom and Federal Environmental
Regulation:A Response to Critics,82 MINN. L. REV. 535, 540-42 (1997).
156. One reason those impacts might be minimal is that our existing constitutional system
is hardly a model of democracy, and is also already subject to serious flaws that undermine its
responsiveness to public opinion. For instance, the recent, dramatic increase in the use of the
filibuster in the Senate has made an already undemocratic institution (given the
malapportionment of Senators by population) even more undemocratic. Senators from twentyone states (which could represent at a minimum only 8.3 percent of the U.S. population) could, in
theory, block any legislation. See David Roberts, How 7.4% of Americans Can Block Humanity's
Efforts to Save Itself, GRIST (Nov. 12, 2009, 5:41 PM), http://www.grist.org/article/2009-11-12how- 7 .4-of-americans-can-block-humanitys-efforts-to-save-itself;
see also BOB DAHL, How
DEMOCRATIC IS THE US CONSTITUTION? 48-54, 81-82 (2001) (noting undemocratic elements of
the U.S. Constitution, such as malapportionment of Senators by population and the selection of
the President by the electoral college). Likewise, as previously discussed, public choice dynamics
already systematically shape our political process, and it is unclear that the strategic use of
interest groups to combat climate change will make the problem any worse.
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scientists call adjusting the planetary "albedo"). 15 7 The annual cost of
deploying this technology at a level that would offset most estimates of
man-made global warming ranges between ten billion to one hundred
billion dollars, well within what is affordable for many countries
around the world. 15 8 There are many risks and problems with using
sulfur aerosols. 15 9 But from the perspective of protecting the ability of
the American public to exercise democratic accountability over climate
change policy, it is hard to see a worse outcome than having another
country unilaterally set the global thermostat. However, American
inaction on climate change policy only increases the risk of such an
outcome.
A related democratic critique of the strategic use of interest
groups to advance climate change policy is that it will encourage rent
seeking by private actors that will either actually undermine the
functioning of democracy, or create the perception that democracy is
being undermined by various actors seeking "corrupt bargains." A
recent example of this concern is the political debate over the
bankruptcy of the solar energy firm Solyndra, which had been the
recipient of federal loan guarantees. Republicans have asserted that
the Obama Administration improperly favored political friends
through the government's support for Solyndra.160 The controversy
appears to have reduced the support among Republicans for
alternative energy subsidies, 16 1 and the risk of rent seeking appears to
motivate many of the critiques by "free-market environmentalists" of
157. The technology more or less mimics the impacts of a massive volcanic eruption, such as
the eruption of Mt. Pinatubo in 1991, which temporarily but significantly reduced global

temperatures. See generally Paul J. Crutzen, Albedo Enhancement by Stratospheric Sulfur
Injections: A Contribution to Resolve a Policy Dilemma?, 77 CLIMATIC CHANGE 211 (2006)
(describing the basic technology and science).

158. See Alan Robock et al., Benefits, Risks, and Costs of StratosphericGeoengineering, 36
GEOPHYSICAL RES. LETTERS L19703 (2009) ("Several billion dollars is a lot of money, but
compared to the international gross national product, this amount would not be a limiting factor
159. See id. (summarizing research on the risks, including possible negative impacts on the
South Asian monsoon and the need to maintain sulfur injections into the atmosphere on a
continual basis for centuries or longer to avoid catastrophic short-term temperature increases).
160. See, e.g., Jonathan Cohn, The Case for Solyndra, NEW REPUBLIC (Sept. 29, 2011, 12:00
http://www.tnr.com/blog/jonathan-cohn/95520/solyndra-bankrupt-solar-panel-green-jobAM),
obama-waste; William Galston, Slow Down on the Solyndra Criticism! Government Can Foster
Innovation, NEW REPUBLIC (Sept. 16, 2011, 12:00 AM), http://www.tnr.com/article/the-vitalcenter/95002/solyndra-westinghouse-solar-brad-plumer-department-energy.
161. See David Weigel, Chart of the Day: The Solyndra Effect, SLATE (Dec. 8, 2011, 3:33 PM),
http://www.slate.com/blogs/weigel/2011/12/08/chartof-the-daythe-solyndraeffect.html
(showing thirty percent decline in Republican support for greater alternative energy research
funding between 2006 and 2011).
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the current regulatory system and of environmental groups. 162 Again,
the question is whether this risk (which perhaps can be reduced by
appropriate design choices) outweighs the benefits of building up an
interest group base for climate change politics. 16 3
As for effectiveness, there certainly are risks to the approach of
consciously building up particular economic sectors in order to
advance climate change policy. Policymakers might guess wrongly as
to how to best encourage the growth of industry and interest groups
that might in turn push for future climate policy. They might not
succeed in encouraging the growth of industry. Worse, they might
succeed in encouraging the growth of the wrong industry, industry
that turns out to not have incentives to push for effective climate
policy in the future, "locking-in" climate policy to a suboptimal or even
counterproductive course. 164 The best example of this risk has been
162. See Zywicki, Environmental Externalities, supra note 122, at 912-13 (arguing that,
because of risk of rent seeking, environmental regulation should only be pursued when benefits
are large); supra notes 120-28 and accompanying text (discussing potential tradeoffs of marketdriven reform); see also Donald T. Hornstein, Self-Interest, Politics, and the Environment-A
Response to Professor Schroeder, 9 DuKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 61, 63 (1998) (noting that rentseeking critiques of environmental law may lead to the "normative case that this whole body of
legislation is suspect"); Wiener, supra note 117, at 754 (noting that "the typical complaint from
public choice theorists is not that there is too little environmental regulation . .. but that there is
too much" because that regulation is primarily rent seeking). Of course, the risk of rent seeking
should be present across the board in policy, such that it should be equally high in the context of
defense spending, highway construction, health care, agricultural policy, or criminal justice. The
focus of some "free-market environmentalist" scholars on deregulation in the environmental
context therefore might be the result of an implicit valuation of the benefits of environmental
protection as being small and, therefore, outweighed by the risks of rent seeking. And indeed,
some of the leading scholars appear to be skeptical of environmental concerns, such as the
existence of climate change. See, e.g., Yandle & Buck, supra note 117, at 229 (expressing "hope
that the fear of global warming will subside, along with efforts to control the world's energy
economies"); id. at 198-200 (adding, after emphasizing the uncertainty in the science in climate
change, that "[o]ne thing, however, is certain: implementation of greenhouse controls like those
in the Kyoto Protocol will introduce further distortions into the current economic state, creating
opportunities for rent-seeking and bootlegging .... ).
163. For an example of a proposal to encourage renewable energy research while reducing
the risk of rent seeking, see Jonathan H. Adler, Eyes on a Climate Prize: Rewarding Energy
Innovation to Achieve Climate Stabilization, 35 HARv. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 1 (2011). It is possible
that any effort to reduce rent seeking might also reduce the interest group benefits of any policy.
For instance, a prize system as proposed by Adler might not build up the kind of economic base
that might be needed for effective lobbying.
The fear of rent seeking has also been drawn upon by critics of cap-and-trade policies and
advocates of a carbon tax. See Mann, The Case for the Carbon Tax, supra note 136, at 10,123.
However, it is unclear why the tax system would be any less vulnerable than cap-and-trade to
rent seeking. The many complexities of the federal tax code show the possible risks of rent
seeking.
164. See Coglianese & D'Ambrosio, supra note 142, at 1423-25 (noting this risk and calling
it the "lock-in" problem).
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the aggressive federal push for the development of corn-based ethanol
biofuels. 165 The politics here are impeccable: the subsidies and tax
credits for corn-based ethanol have encouraged significant
investments in farms, refineries, and fuel distribution systems; 166
rural constituencies (particularly in the Great Plains, at the heart of
the ethanol industry) are overrepresented in the U.S. Senate and
therefore have disproportionate political power; 167 the industry is
fairly concentrated and maintains a powerful lobbying force.16 8 The
problem is that it has become clear that corn-based ethanol is not an
adequate solution to climate change, and in fact probably makes the
problem worse.169 Thus, empowering the corn-based ethanol industry
arguably has led to a cul-de-sac in climate policy, as its interests in
expanding its particular niche in the energy market are not congruent
with effective climate policy.1 70
Corn-based ethanol shows the risks of trying to empower
industry that will support future climate policy. But first, cul-de-sacs

165. See id. at 1424 (citing ethanol as an example of the problem).
166. See Robert W. Hahn, Ethanol: Law, Economics, and Politics, 19 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV.
434, 434 (2008) (predicting huge growth in ethanol production resulting from government
policies); Donald T. Hornstein, The Environmental Role of Agriculture in an Era of Carbon Caps,
20 HEALTH MATRIX 145, 153-54 (2010) (recounting history of society's ethanol demand). For an
overview of the relevant law, see Hahn, supra,at 437-4 1. Estimates of the total amount spent on
ethanol subsidies range into the tens of billions of dollars. Id. at 439-40.
167. The benefits of ethanol subsidies also were concentrated in specific rural counties. See
Stephen P. Holland et al., Some Inconvenient Truths About Climate Change Policy: The
DistributionalImpacts of TransportationPolicies 16-17 (Energy Inst. at Haas, Working Paper
No. 220, 2011).
168. See Hahn, supra note 166, at 461-63 (describing the power of ADM, a major ethanol
provider); Hornstein, supra note 166, at 160-62 (describing the power of ethanol lobby in the
context of climate legislation in Congress).
169. Hahn, supra note 166, at 446-49; Hornstein, supra note 166, at 154-57. There are also
potential negative impacts from biofuels on food prices. Hornstein, supra note 166, at 154-55. In
a small bit of irony, the largest contributor to the Proposition 23 Yes campaign was Valero, a
Texas refiner that had recently invested in ethanol. The decision of California regulators to
categorize ethanol as a high-carbon fuel that would be disfavored under the new regulatory
scheme might have contributed to Valero's decision to fund Proposition 23. See supra note 66 and
accompanying text (regarding Valero's interesting funding position); see also Hornstein, supra
note 166, at 157-60 (describing how California regulatory policies disadvantage corn-based
ethanol and other efforts by ethanol industry to attack those policies).
170. See, e.g., POOLEY, supra note 69, at 390-91 & 391 n.* (describing how farm state
Democrats successfully pushed for corn-based ethanol to be favorably treated in WaxmanMarkey, despite its known environmental problems). It is possible that by encouraging the
development of research and investment in biofuels that are more effective from a climate
perspective, support for corn-based ethanol will have a long-run beneficial effect. This, in turn,
depends on factors such as how transferable investments in corn-based ethanol are to other,
more sustainable biofuels, and how willing the corn-based ethanol industry is to accept or even
encourage policy that pushes a shift to these other fuels.
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need not be one way. It can be possible to undo the errors of policy
mistakes. The primary tax credit for ethanol, for instance, just ended
as a result of environmental and budgetary critiques of the fuel. 71
Second, as I noted earlier, entrenched interest groups are an
inevitable part of the political landscape. Climate policy will have to
work with or against those entrenched interest groups. One option is
to try and fight all or many of those entrenched interest groups in
hopes of designing a climate policy that is as flexible and optimal as
possible, but with the risk of failing to enact any climate policy at all.
Another option is to try to work with and shape the interest group
landscape, increasing the possibility of enacting a climate policy, but
also increasing the risk that any such climate policy might be
dysfunctional or ineffective in one way or another.172 Proposition 23
gives a possible example of the promise of this second approach;
maybe the concomitant risks are therefore worth accepting. 173
Third, it is quite plausible that sophisticated, strategic interest
groups are very aware of the possibility of dynamic shifts in the
political and economic landscape because of policy changes, and that
they therefore might resist even small policy steps that could build up
interest groups that would pose a threat in the future. Indeed, there is
evidence that fossil fuel industries are currently quite aware of this
threat and have taken aggressive steps to challenge or eliminate
subsidies, tax credits, and other support for renewable energy because
of the long-term risk that a rising renewable energy industry might

171. Robert Pear, After Three Decades, Tax Credit for Ethanol Expires, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1,
2012,
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/02/business/energy-environment/after-three-decadesfederal-tax-credit-for-ethanol-expires.html.
172. See POOLEY, supra note 69, at 402-03 (arguing that complexity of the cap-and-trade
provisions in Waxman-Markey was necessary to obtain passage, and that a "simple carbon tax"
"would never pass" unless it became just as complicated).
173. There are two other possible risks that seem relatively less important. First, aggressive
climate change policy in one jurisdiction may support the growth of supportive industry in that
jurisdiction, but push industries that oppose further policy into other jurisdictions, where they
might increase their political control and prevent policy changes. See Brewster, supra note 5, at
278 (calling this "political leakage"). At least at the domestic level within the United States,
however, the chances that California's climate policies will lead to a higher level of (for instance)
coal-based industry in states such as West Virginia or Kentucky, and therefore will interfere
with progress at the federal level, seem relatively small. Such states are already heavily coaldependent, and in any case, the more likely movement of industry is overseas, rather than
domestically.
Second, successful incremental policy may 'lull" the public and the political system into not
taking additional steps to address climate change. See Coglianese & D'Ambrosio, supranote 142,
at 1425. But lulling may not occur if the political and economic interests created by incremental
policy steps see it as in their self-interest to push for additional legislation.
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pose to them.174 In other words, perhaps there is no low-hanging fruit
in climate change policy, from a political context, and there is no
advantage to an incremental approach.
While this concern is real, it is not insurmountable. Powerful
political actors might be co-opted through the right kinds of policy
choices and used to resist the pressures from other interest groups.
This is in fact what happened in California, where the electric utilities
became strong advocates for AB 32 and important counterweights to
out-of-state oil and gas interests. Some kinds of incremental steps will
be more politically appealing than others-renewable portfolio
standards have been an example of this up to now-and therefore
more difficult for opposing interest groups to resist. Of course,
opposing interest groups will not be savvy and sophisticated at all
times, allowing an opening for initial steps that might then build
momentum.
IV. LESSONS FROM A COMPARISON OF CALIFORNIA AND FEDERAL
EXPERIENCES WITH CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY

At the same time Proposition 23 was soundly defeated, the U.S.
Congress failed to enact significant climate policy at the federal level.
The political odds seemed as good as they could get for federal
legislation: a President who had campaigned on the issue and strong
majorities for the political party that had made the issue part of its
policy agenda. Yet while a comprehensive bill passed the House of
Representatives, it had little or no chance of passage in the Senate,
where states that have significant economic dependence on fossil fuels
(such as Wyoming and West Virginia) have political power
disproportionate to their population.
Certainly those who pushed for a climate bill in 2009-10 were
quite aware of the importance of working with existing interest groups
and making the case that climate policy has economic benefits.17 5 They
argued that the climate bill would produce "green jobs" in the
renewable energy industry; they conducted difficult negotiations with
174. See Suzanne Goldenberg, Conservative Thinktanks Step Up Attacks Against Obama's
Clean Energy Strategy, THE GUARDIAN (May 8, 2012, 4:44 PM), http://www.guardian.co.uk
(alleging coordinated
/environment/2012/may/08/conservative-thinktanks-obama-energy-plans
effort by conservative think tanks funded by oil, gas, and coal industry to attack renewable
power mandates in individual states).
175. See POOLEY, supra note 69, at 385-86 (arguing that proponents understood that "[g]ood
intentions" will not solve global warming, and that "[w]ithout lobbyists from Goldman and Credit
Suisse and [other industries] pushing hard for a climate bill because it was in their interest to do
so, the lobbyists from the coal and oil industries would never be defeated").
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representatives of the electricity industry to find ways to ease the
difficult transition away from coal. 1 6 Yet the bill still failed.
What lessons can we draw from the comparison between the
failure at the federal level and the success at the state level in
California? The Proposition 23 campaign was fought on an economic
and political landscape that had already changed in response to prior
energy legislation in the state. As a result, the arguments about the
potential for jobs and economic growth from renewable energy were
more plausible in California, where the renewable energy industry
had already significantly developed. In contrast, at the federal level,
the public had doubts .about whether green jobs would, in fact,
materialize.177 The fact that industry had already partially adapted to
existing climate policies in California meant that climate legislation in
the state did not have to make explicit giveaways to get buy-in from
industry.178 That contrasted with the "Christmas tree" appearance of
the federal climate bill, in particular the giveaways of carbon dioxide

176. For examples of supporters of climate legislation relying on jobs as a key argument,
including candidate and President Obama, see, for example, id. at 279-81, 285-92, 298, 354-58,
383-84, 388-90. For an overview of those difficult negotiations, see id. at 359-81. Proponents
also counted on support from the financial industry, which would benefit from setting up the
infrastructure for a market-based mechanism. Id. at 384-85. Of course, in the wake of the global
financial crisis, many critics saw this as a bug, not a feature. Id.
The environmental groups generally supported cap-and-trade in the push for federal
legislation, in direct contrast to predictions by "free-market environmentalists" that any carbon
regulation would be command and control because of rent seeking by industry and
environmental groups. See Yandle & Buck, supra note 117, at 193 ("[A]n important implication
of the bootleggers and Baptists theory is that global environmental regulation will
overwhelmingly favor flat command-and-control standards, rather than taxes or tradable
permits."); see also Zywicki, Environmental Externalities, supra note 122, at 881 (arguing that
environmental groups should show a preference for more efficient regulation but do not do so and
do not support market-based regulations). Equally problematic for these predictions is
California's adoption of a cap-and-trade system for greenhouse gases, over the objections of
environmental groups that sought a carbon tax. See Ann Carlson, AB 32 Lawsuit: Assessing the
Environmental Justice Arguments Against Cap and Trade, LEGAL PIANET (Mar. 22, 2011),
https://legalplanet.wordpress.com/2011/03/22/ab-32-lawsuit-assessing-the-environmental-justicearguments-against-cap-and-trade/ (describing litigation); Cara Horowitz, Court Issues Final
Ruling in AB 32 Challenge, LEGAL PLANET (Mar. 21, 2011), https://legalplanet.wordpress
.com/2011/03/2 1/court-issues-final-ruling-in-ab-32-challenge-enjoins-implementation-of-ab-32scoping-plan-pending-ceqa-fixes/ (same).
177. Compare BOB EPSTEIN, LESSONS FROM PROP 23-WINNING ENVIRONMENTAL
CAMPAIGNS INTHE "TEA PARTY" ERA (2011), available at http://www.e2.org/ext/doc/Epstein-ERGApril2011.pdf (showing polling data that sixty-five percent of Californians believe renewable
energy is a plausible source of future jobs, versus twenty-five percent who are skeptical), with
POOLEY, supra note 69, at 415 (citing national polling data that showed skepticism about clean
energy jobs).
178. AB 32 contains no specific allocations for allowances to any industry group, and is
extremely short in comparison to Waxman-Markey.
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emission allowances to industry, which opponents seized upon to
argue that it was part of a conspiracy by big business. 7 9
In hindsight, perhaps the better choice at the federal level in
2009-10 would have been to enact a bill that focused on relatively
noncontroversial choices, such as providing long-term subsidies and
tax breaks for renewable energy research, development and/or
installation, 18 0 or a national RPS. 181 Such legislation would have been
more likely to pass now, and it would have laid the economic and
political groundwork Oust as in California) for more aggressive efforts
in the future.182
The importance of laying that groundwork was made
particularly clear by the nature of the debate over the federal climate
bill. Advocates for the bill had significant amounts of money at their
disposal for advertising and lobbying, an unusual turn of events from
the standard situation in environmental policy.183 Yet opponents of the
bill were still able to turn public opinion against the proposal.184
179. For discussion of the allowances given to industry to obtain their support, POOLEY,
supra note 69, at 376-78. For discussion of how giveaways were used by opponents to attack
Waxman-Markey, see, for example, id. at 332-33, 364-65, 386-87, 411. Proponents of WaxmanMarkey contended that all of the various elements went toward "consumer protection, green job
creation, and clean energy R&D." Id. at 357; see also PATASHNIK, supra note 5, at 143 (arguing
that the presence of large giveaways in order to ensure the enactment of policy changes shows
that the underlying political dynamics are not favorable for the durability of those changes).
180. A weakness of existing federal renewable energy subsidies is that they have been
extended for only a year or two at a time, reducing their effectiveness in encouraging long-term
investment. See Kate Galbraith, Future of Solar and Wind Power May Hinge on Federal Aid,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/26/business/energy-environment/
future-of-solar-and-wind-power-may-hinge-on-federal-aid.html. Longer-term subsidies might be
much more effective in building the renewable energy industry in the United States, even if
those subsidies are not higher. Id.; see also MARK MURO ET AL., BROOKINGS INST., SIZING THE
CLEAN EcONOMY: A NATIONAL AND REGIONAL JOBS ASSESSMENT 33-41 (2011) (noting the
significant drop off in renewable funding that will occur with expiration of stimulus bill support
in 2012-13, and noting the impact this will have on long-term renewable energy investment);
Tiffany Hsu, Obama's Clean-Energy Goals Have Industry Questioning Feasibility, L.A. TIMES,
http://articles.latimes.com/2011/jan/27/business/la-fi-obama-clean-energy2011,
27,
Jan.
20110127.
181. A major strategy choice facing Democrats in 2009 was whether to pursue one single,
large energy bill, or split it into two bills (subsidies/RPS and cap-and-trade). POOLEY, supra note
69, at 314-15, 414-15. The former choice won out in the House. Id. Leading Senators, however,
sought to take a different approach. Id. at 314-15, 416.
182. The large subsidies given to renewable energy in the 2009 economic stimulus bill may
help significantly in laying this groundwork. See Mounteer, supra note 84, at 11,090 (outlining
history, structure, and outlays of the economic stimulus bill regarding investments in renewable
energy).
183. Former Vice President Al Gore promised to raise $300 million for three years of media
advertising to support climate change legislation from 2008 through 2010, as well as provide
significant additional support for lobbying and activism. POOLEY, supra note 69, at 117, 304-05,
328-83; see also MATTHEW C. NISBET, CLIMATE SHIFT: CLEAR VISION FOR THE NEXT DECADE OF
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PUBLIC
DEBATE
2
(2011),
available
at
http://climateshiftproject.org/wpcontent/uploads/2011/08/ClimateShift reportJune2Oll.pdf (describing other large gifts of
money amounting to tens of millions of dollars to environmental organizations to campaign for
climate change policy); id. at 15 (estimating that environmental organizations spent about $394
million on climate change policy in 2009). The actual total raised by Gore appears to amount to
somewhat less than promised. See id. at iv, 13 tbl.1.6, 14 tbl.1.7, 21-22 (concluding that Gore's
organizations raised and spent a total of about $115 million in 2008 and 2009). While this
amount was vastly greater than the activist group spending from opposing non-profits (such as
the Competitive Enterprise Institute), id. at 7-8, tbls.1.1 & 1.2; POOLEY, supra note 69, at 121, it
was comparable to the spending on lobbying and advertising by industry trade associations,
NISBET, supra, at 9 tbl.1.3, 16-17 & fig.1.1 (calculating that industry associations spent $218
million on climate and energy issues in 2009, and that the total including conservative think
tanks was $259 million); POOLEY, supra note 69, at 185-86, 299, 407 (describing tens of millions
of dollars spent on lobbying and media by the coal industry in 2008 to oppose climate legislation);
id. at 202-03, 228 (describing lobbying and advertising efforts by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce
and National Association of Manufacturers); id. at 220, 299, 405-06, 410-11 (describing heavy
lobbying and advertising by individual companies and trade associations including the American
Petroleum Institute). On the other hand, industry was not unified; there were significant
industry players who helped support (to a greater or lesser extent) the push for climate
legislation, such as General Electric, Duke Energy, and others, as part of the U.S. Climate Action
Partnership, or USCAP. See NISBET, supra, at 16-21 & tbls.1.09-1.11 (showing that corporations
and trade associations that publicly supported federal climate legislation spent approximately
$217 million on all lobbying activities (not just climate change), while those opposed spent
approximately $272 million on all lobbying activities); POOLEY, supra note 69, at 139-41, 154-55,
332-33 (describing each company's support). Some observers have questioned the estimates of
spending provided by Nisbet, arguing that he significantly overestimated environmental
fundraising and spending, and underestimated industry fundraising and spending. See Joe

Romm, Climate Shift Data Reanalysis Makes Clear Opponents of Climate Bill Far Outspent
Environmentalists, THINKPROGRESS (Apr. 19, 2011, 4:18 PM), http://thinkprogress.org
/romm/2011/04/19/207910/climate-shift-data-reanalysis/
(reanalyzing
"Nisbet's
debunked
financial analysis"); see also Andrew C. Revkin, Beyond the Climate Blame Game, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 25, 2011, 2:18 PM), http://dotearth.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/04/25/ beyond-the-climateblame-game/ (providing debate overview regarding Nisbet report).
The simple calculations of money, however, do not tell the entire story. First, industry and
conservative groups had an advantage in that their donations were predominantly taxable ones
that are more usable for lobbying and activism, while environmental groups predominantly
raised tax-deductible donations that were restricted in how they could be used for lobbying,
NISBET, supra, at 9, 15-18. Second, calculation of all lobbying by corporations listed as publicly
supporting federal climate change legislation is somewhat misleading, as those corporations
were sometimes only fickle allies. See POOLEY, supra note 69, at 154-55 (describing how Duke
Energy only occasionally allied with environmentalists in legislative fights); Romm, supra
(noting changing waves of corporate sponsorship of climate legislation). Third, opponents of
climate change legislation appeared to have been more effective in putting their money into
television advertising. NISBET, supra, at 21-22 (finding that supporters of legislation spent about
$48 million on advertising and opponents spent $167 million, with more provided by oil company
advertising intended to improve their corporate images). In addition, there was significant free
conservative media (such as Rush Limbaugh and Glenn Beck) that vociferously attacked climate
legislation. See, e.g., POOLEY, supra note 69, at 362-63, 396-98, 400-01, 411-13.
184. See, e.g., POOLEY, supra note 69, at 235-36, 301-03 (describing how coal industry
advertising increased favorability ratings for the coal industry, a major opponent of climate
legislation, and for increasing public support for delaying climate legislation until "clean coal"
technology was available); id. at 401-02 ("butt kicking" by conservative media after Waxman-
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The challenge in climate policy (as many commentators have
noted) is that addressing the problem will require significant changes
in behavior by the public at large, such as changes in the form and
nature of transportation, the built environment, and consumption
choices.185 This stands in contrast to most of the past efforts to deal
with environmental problems, which have emphasized imposing
regulatory mandates and costs on industry through command-and
control regulation, meaning that industry is faced with the burden of
adjustment (instead of the public). Focusing the burden on regulated
industry probably makes the public choice dynamics of enacting
environmental legislation worse (since regulated industry tends to be
a relatively small, concentrated group), but for the public it likely
minimizes the appearance of costs of environmental regulation. 86 The
costs of environmental regulation are probably much more important
for the public in the context of climate change given the fundamental
role that carbon emissions play in modern, industrial economies,187
and this was a major factor in the debate over the federal climate bill
as opponents constantly raised the issue of cost.'8 8
Markey passed the House "left the bill's reputation in tatters"); id. at 419 (describing a rise in
climate skepticism in the American public in the wake of the debate over Waxman-Markey).
185. See, e.g., Katrina Fischer Kuh, CapturingIndividual Harms, 35 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV.
155, 159-61 (2011) (providing overview of relevant literature); Michael P. Vandenbergh & Anne
C. Steinemann, The Carbon-NeutralIndividual, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1673, 1673 (2007) (noting that
one-third of carbon emissions could be eliminated through actions taken by individuals).
186. See VICTOR, supra note 129, at 66-67 (noting government control of cost visibility); Eric
Biber, Climate Change and Backlash, 17 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 1295, 1317-25 (2009) (noting
political dynamics of regulating climate change-causing behaviors may be difficult because of
resistance to imposing constraints on long-standing individual activities); Katrina Fischer Kuh,
When Government Intrudes: Regulating Individual Behaviors that Harm the Environment, 61
DUKE L.J. 1111, 1125 (2012) (noting that there is often much greater political resistance to direct
regulation of individual behavior compared to regulation of industrial activities that will,
indirectly, affect individual actions); Jonathan Chait, Why Health Care Reform Beat Out Climate,
NEW REPUBLIC (Sept. 10, 2010, 2:30 PM), http://www.tnr.com/blog/jonathan-chait/77589/whyhealth-care-reform-beat-out-climate (arguing that the primary goal of policymakers after failure
of Waxman-Markey is to achieve climate change policy by minimizing the public appearance of
cost, rather than actual cost); M.S., The Irony of the Tragedy of the Commons, ECONOMIST (Feb.
2011,
10:58
PM),
http://www.economist.com/blogs/democracyinamerica/2011/02/
24,
environmental-regulation (noting survey that finds that American public prefers regulation to
cap-and-trade or taxation as solutions to climate change).
187. For instance, imposition of a carbon tax or cap-and-trade constraints will result in
higher gasoline prices for drivers and higher electricity prices for consumers.
188. For examples of opponents challenging federal climate change policy on cost grounds,
and offering amendments that would suspend any legislation if any cost increases occurred at
all, see POOLEY, supra note 69, at 230-31, 239, 337, 350-51, 358, 365, 387-88, 401-02. The
public support for legislation tends to fall significantly when cost is put into consideration. Id. at
238 (describing poll in which support for legislation falls from sixty-six percent to forty-four
percent if it would result in higher gas prices in the short term). The scale and scope of
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Climate policy thus might present different political dynamics
than traditional environmental regulation. Traditional environmental
regulation tends to exemplify benefits that are broadly distributed,
and costs that are concentrated, and such legislation is difficult to
pass absent aggressive political efforts by leading political
"entrepreneurs."189 But while climate policy might involve this
dynamic to some extent,190 it also involves broadly distributed costs
and benefits.'19 While this might seem to make the passage of
legislation easier,192 in the context of environmental regulation this
might not in fact be the case. Where environmental regulation (as
with climate change) requires substantial changes in long-standing,
individual behavior by the public at large, the politics may be quite
toxic.
Building the political and economic interest groups that
support climate policy (as in California) might make this task easier
in two ways: First, if the public sees the benefits of climate policy as
plausibly more than just environmental ones, then that might make a
significant difference in the political feasibility of legislation.193
Second, if the political and economic interest groups in favor of climate
change become powerful enough, then the political dynamics of
regulating greenhouse gas emissions, for instance, means that it will be much more likely that
increased costs for industry (such as electricity utilities) will be passed through to consumers in a
way that is significant and, therefore, politically relevant. Utility executives feared that they
would be blamed by the public for the high raises, resulting in a political and regulatory
backlash. Id. at 336-37. Waxman-Markey made extensive efforts to avoid raising the retail price
of electricity. Id. at 351 n.*.
189. Political scientist James Q. Wilson calls this "entrepreneurial politics." James Q.
Wilson, The Politics of Regulation, in THE POLITICS OF REGULATION 357, 370 (James Q. Wilson
ed., 1980); see also Cook, supra note 5, at 468, 477 (noting the difficulty of enacting legislation in
this kind of political environment). High profile political leadership was generally absent
throughout the debates on climate policy, POOLEY, supra note 69, at 238-39 (noting climate
activist lamenting the lack of an "elder statesman" to take the lead), particularly leadership from
the White House, id. at 242 (climate activists concluding that only presidential leadership would
push a climate bill through); id. at 392, 398, 414-20 (concluding that lack of public White House
leadership doomed the climate bill in 2009-10).
190. The more that a regulatory system is able to force costs on regulated industry without
allowing costs to pass through to consumers, the more it will resemble this option.
191. The benefits are reductions in damaging changes to the global climate, benefits that are
shared by all humans. The costs would be (in the context of the United States) the risk of
increased energy prices, shared by all consumers of energy.
192. Wilson calls this kind of dynamic "majoritarian politics" and argues that it depends on
receiving substantial public support for success. Wilson, supra note 189, at 367-68.
193. This is particularly so because the economic benefits will be present in the shorter term
and are more concrete compared to the environmental benefits. See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The
Psychology of Global Climate Change, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 299, 308 (discussing society's balance
of current economic and future environmental benefits).
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climate change might change once again, to a situation where a
concentrated industry might benefit from regulatory changes. 194 This
dynamic is often the most promising in terms of encouraging the
passage and implementation of legislation.195
CONCLUSION
The campaign over Proposition 23 indicates the importance of
history and developing an interest group landscape that is friendly to
climate change legislation before developing comprehensive
legislation. That does not mean that the only thing that matters is the
interest group landscape. The voting patterns both in the U.S.
Congress and among Californians indicate that climate change is also
tied up with underlying partisan commitments 96 and likely cultural
ones as well. 197 Making the interest group landscape more
accommodating for climate change legislation may not solve partisan
or cultural polarization over climate change--other solutions may be
194. Wilson calls this "client politics." Wilson, supra note 189, at 369.
195. Id. (speculating that the rise of "watchdog" and "public interest" organizations may
have made the politics more difficult). The success of the hazardous waste treatment industry in
lobbying for stricter waste treatment and disposal standards is an example of this dynamic. See
Landy & Hague, supra note 116, at 67 (describing the lobbying efforts of the hazardous waste
treatment industry).
196. See infra Table 4. For additional evidence of the sharpening partisan divide on climate
change, see Riley E. Dunlap & Aaron M. McCright, A Widening Gap: Republican and Democratic
Views on Climate Change, ENVIRONMENT, Sept.-Oct. 2008, at 26, 26, available at
http://www.environmentmagazine.org/Archives/Back%20Issues/September-October%202008
/dunlap-full.html ("What had been a modest, but significant, difference in Republican and
Democratic levels of pro-environmental voting in Congress since 1970 has grown over time,
especially after the Republican takeover of the U.S. House of Representatives in 1994.");
Matthew C. Nisbet, Communicating Climate Change: Why Frames Matter for Public
Mar.-Apr. 2009, at 12, 14, available at http://www.
Engagement, ENVIRONMENT,
environmentmagazine.org/Archives/Back%20Issues/March-April%202009/Nisbet-full.html
("Predictably, on climate change, poll analyses reveal politically polarized opinions, resulting in
two Americas divided along ideological lines."); Nisbet, supra note 129, at 360-61 (noting that
climate change has joined other contentious issues like gun control and abortion as "one of the
few issues that have come to define what it means to be a partisan in the United States").
197. For evidence that cultural perspectives shape the policy preferences of Americans on
climate change, see Dan M. Kahan et al., Cultural Cognition of Scientific Consensus, J. RISK
RES., Feb. 2011, at 147, 166-67 (concluding that Americans' beliefs related to climate change are
grounded in "cultural variables"); Anthony Leiserowitz, Climate Change Risk Perception and
Policy Preferences: The Role of Affect, Imagery, and Values, CLIMATIC CHANGE, July 2006, at 45,
63 ("Support for national and international climate policies was strongly associated with proegalitarian values, while opposition was associated with anti-egalitarian, pro-individualist and
pro-hierarchist values."); Robert E. O'Connor et al., Who Wants to Reduce Greenhouse Gas
Emissions?, Soc. SCI. Q., Mar. 2002, at 1, 15 ("Although Democrats are more likely to support
government mitigation programs, party identification accounts for much less variance than
either cognitive or economic measures.").
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required for those challenges.198 Nonetheless, ensuring that important
political and economic interests groups are at least not opposed to
climate change is a necessary, even if not sufficient, condition for
legislation. It is therefore vital that this foundation be laid.
The path to climate change policy that I have briefly sketched
in this Article is a circuitous one that requires building up interest
groups that would support the climate change policy we need to avoid
the worst possible outcomes.199 This may be understandably
frustrating to those who see the urgency of the problem of climate
change and the need for political action as quickly as possible.
Nevertheless, sometimes the most direct route is not the quickest. The
efforts to extend the Kyoto process have failed so far at the
international level, and the efforts to enact significant federal
legislation have failed even with the most propitious political
circumstances possible. Changing the underlying politics requires
changing the interests of the people involved in the political process.
Until that happens, we will be faced with failures again and again.

198. For suggestions as to possible solutions, see, for example, Dunlap & McCright, supra
note 196, at 34 ("There is an obvious need for pollsters to monitor Americans' views of global
warming carefully over the next few years, paying special attention to the possibility that the
views of self-identified Republicans and Democrats may converge or continue on their divergent
paths. Regardless of their paths, though, the results will have major implications for
policymaking on climate change."); Kahan et al., supra note 197, at 169 (arguing that
"communicators must attend to the cultural meaning as well as the scientific content of
information" in order to effectively change public perceptions of climate change); Nisbet, supra
note 196, at 22 ("One way to reach audiences is to recruit their influential peers to pass on
selectively framed information about climate change that resonates with the background of the
targeted audience and that addresses their personal information needs.").
199. Some key political players think of the process in this dynamic way. See POOLEY, supra
note 69, at 95 (quoting Senator Lieberman, a major proponent for climate legislation, stating
that "[w]e needed to establish a long-term trajectory for emissions reductions because once we
did that, we would flip the political game and empower the industries and resources of the
future").
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Table 1: Historic Overview of Major California Energy
Legislation
Title

Year

Description
Created California Energy Commission ("CEC") (then
called State Energy Resources Conservation &
Development Commission) with authority to establish
energy conservation standards and incentives
(including building code and appliance standards) and
encourage conservation research and development.
Building standards were first adopted in 1977 and
updated on three-year cycle.

SB 218

1976

Income tax credit equal to 10% of the costs of solar
energy equipment for heating, cooling, and electrical
generation. Tax credit continues until 1986, then
revived in 2001 and extended through 2005. (AB 1558,
1977; AB 2036, 1980; SB 17xx, 2001)

AB 1512

1977

Requires CEC to develop & coordinate R&D program
for alternative sources of energy.

1978

Tax credits of 55% up to $3000 for investment in small
wind and solar systems, and 25% for any system
exceeding $12,000 in cost. Continued through 1986.
Restored from 2001 through 2005 (SBl7xx, 2001).

AB 3623

CPUC Decision
82-12-055

CPUC Decision
83-09-054

1982

Ballot initiative passes that amends state's
constitution to give legislature authority to exclude
construction of solar energy systems from property tax.
Implemented by legislation until 1995, and then
revived in 1999 through 2016. (SB 1306, 1980; SB 103,
1991; AB 1755, 1999; AB 1099, 2005; AB 1451, 2008)
California Public Utility Commission ("CPUC"), rate
regulatory agency for state, makes California the first
state to adjust rate regulation for electricity utilities to
remove disincentives for energy efficiency and
conservation. (Decoupling)
Establishes standard contract to encourage renewable
energy purchases by utilities. (Interim Standard Offer
Contract 4) Withdrawn in 1985 due to concerns of
excess capacity and overpayments.
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1995

First net metering law in California which allows
consumers to receive credit for electricity produced by
on-site solar.

1996

Electricity deregulation ends decoupling, replaces with
surcharge on electricity rates (public goods charge) to
fund energy efficiency programs and renewable energy
programs run by CEC and utilities. (AB 995, 2000
extended charge through 2012. SB 90, 1997 specified
details of CEC renewable energy program.).

Public Interest Energy Research ("PIER") program
created by CEC, funded by electricity surcharge.
Supports R&D in energy efficiency and renewable
energy.

CPUC Decision
01-03-073

2001

Creates Small Generator Incentive Program ("SGIP")
which provides payments for renewable energy
production by consumers. Total amount paid since
2001 is $421 million in utility rebates and $371 million
in CEC payments/incentives. (CPUC D05-12-044)
Extended through 2016 by SB 412 (2010).

Creates standard requiring retail electricity sellers to
increase amount of renewable energy in portfolios by
1% per year and mandates (with qualifications) 20%
renewables by 2017.
Sets standards for emissions of greenhouse gases from
autos and light duty trucks. Implemented by state Air
Resources Board ("ARB").

SB 1078

2002

AB 1493

2002

SB 812

2002

Creates California Climate Action Registry, which
records/registers voluntary GHG reductions made
since 1990 by participating entities.

AB 1007

2005

Requires ARB, in consultation with CEC and other
state agencies, to develop and adopt state plan to
increase use of alternative fuels, by June 30, 2007.

SB 1368

2006

Limits investments in baseload electricity generation
by state utilities to power plants that meet an
emissions performance standard ("EPS") established
by CEC and CPUC.
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CPUC Decision
06-01-024

2006
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CPUC establishes the California Solar Initiative to
provide "up to $2.8 billion in incentives for solar
projects" and provide 3000 MW of solar power by 2017.
(CPUC, 2005-06). (Replaces in part prior SGIP and
CEC programs.)

SB 1

2006

"Million Solar Roofs" bill. Increases net metering,
mandates that solar becomes a "standard option" for
buyers of new homes by 2011.
Reduces greenhouse gas emissions to 1990 levels by
2020 and 80% reduction by 2050.

2006

Accelerates RPS requirement from 2017 to 2010.

SB 375

2008

Requires local governments to develop ways to reduce
climate change impacts from land-use planning
decisions

SB X1-2

2011

RPS standard increased to 33% by 2020.

SB 107

458

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66:2:399

Table 2: Statewide Vote Breakdown and Total Votes for Major
2010 California Races
Proposition/Election

Votes
For/Against

Percentage
For/Against

Total Votes

(D)/(R)

(D)/(R)

Proposition 23
(Suspend AB 32)
Proposition 19
(Marijuana legalization)
Proposition 20
(Congressional redistricting)
Proposition 21
(State parks car registration fee)
222
Proposition
Prpsto
.
(Limitations on state use of local
funds)
funds)

3,733,883/
5,974,564
4,643,592/
5,333,230
5,743,069/
3,636,892
4,190,643/
5,615,595

38.4/
61.6
46.5/
53.5
61.2/
38.7
42.7/
57.3

5,733,755/

60.6/

Proposition 24
(Business tax reform)
Proposition 25
(Majority budget vote)
Proposition 26
(2/3 Vote fee raise requirement)
Proposition 27
(Repeal of state legislature
redistricting reforms)

3,947,502/
5,470,477
5,262,052/
4,292,648
4,923,824/
4.470,234

41.9/
58.1
55.1/
44.9
52.5/
47.5

3,736,443/

40.6/

Governor

5,428,149/
4,127,391

53.8/
40.9

Lieutenant Governor

4,917,880/
3,820,971

50.2/9,796,574
39

Secretary of State

5,105,307/
3,666,407

53.2/586,442
38.2

Treasurer

5,433,222/

56.5/

3,479,709

36.2

AttorneyGeneral4,368,624

5,325,357/
3,487,014
4,442,781/

55.2/
36/1
46.1/
45.3

U.S. Senator

5,218,137/

52.2/9,996,431

Controller

Note: All data from California Secretary of State.

9,976,822
9,379,961
9,806,238

.9,458,769

3,725,014

4,217,386

9,778,407

9,45.46

42.2

9,554,700
9,394,968
9,205,146
10,089,046

9,616,322

9,637,268
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Table 3: Proposition 23 Compared to Other Significant
Environmentally Related Propositions in California
Proposition (Year)

Votes For/Against

Percentage For/Against

3,733,883/
5,974,564
3,861,217/
4,635,265
3,528,887/
3,842,733
3,932,043/
4,324,722
2,108,389/
5,201,891
2,776,345/
2,108,512
6,680,485/
6,015,944
4,502,235/
8,155,181
5,098,666/
7,464,154

38.4/
61.6
45.40/
54.6
47.97/
53.13
47.60/
52.40
28.84/
71.16
56.90/
43.1
52.70/
47.30
35.50/
64.50
40.50/
59.50

(Description)

Proposition 23 (2010)
(Suspend AB 32)
Proposition 87 (2006) (Oil
severance tax)
Proposition 130 (1990)
("Forests Forever")
Proposition 90 (2006)
(Takings)
Proposition 138 (1990) ("The
Big Stump")
Proposition 40 (2002) (Parks
bond initiative)
Proposition 1A (High-speed
rail initiative)
Proposition 7 (Renewable
energy mandate)
Proposition 10 (Alternative
fuel vehicles)
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Table 4: OLS Regression Coefficients with County-Level
Proposition 23 Votes
Independent Variable

Coefficient

Standard
Error

P-value

-.335

.152

.03

-.556

.085

<.001

Unemployment Rate 2010
Log Per Capita Carbon
Emissions 2002

.003
.001

.002
.012

.18
.915

Log Income 2010
Percentage Population
Hispanic 2010
Log MW Total Renewable
Energy Projects
Log Total Renewable Energy
Potential

-.007

.023

.97

-.007

.053

.89

.001

.001

.47

-.003

.0025

.22

Constant

.837

.274

.004

Yes Vote on Proposition 21
(2010)

Vote for Democratic
Gubernatorial Candidate
(2010)

Notes: Vote and registration data from California Secretary of State. Unemployment is the
average annual rate for 2010 from Bureau of Labor Statistics. Income and Percentage
Population Hispanic are from U.S. Census. Per Capital Carbon Emissions are as of 2002 and
are from Kevin R. Gurney et al., High Resolution Fossil Fuel Combustion CO 2 Emissions
Fluxes for the United States, 43 ENvTL. Sci. TECH. 5535 (2009). "MW Renewable Energy
Projects" is in megawatts and is based on data from the California Energy Commission and
the California Public Utilities Commission; they include all renewable energy projects (defined
as wind, solar, and geothermal) either operational or approved as of October 2010. "Renewable
Energy Potential" is based on data from the California Energy Commission, and is a sum of
estimated potential high-speed wind, photovoltaic and thermal solar, and geothermal energy
available for exploitation. See GEORGE SIMONS & JOE MCCABE, CALIFORNIA SOLAR
RESOURCES, IN SUPPORT OF THE 2005 INTEGRATED ENERGY POLICY REPORT (2005), available at
http://www.energy.ca.gov/2005publications/CEC-500-2005-072/CEC-500-2005-072-D.PDF;
ELAINE SISON-LEBRILLA & VALENTINO TIANGCO, CALIFORNIA GEOTHERMAL RESOURCES, IN
SUPPORT OF THE 2005 INTEGRATED ENERGY POLICY REPORT (2005), available at
http://www.energy.ca.gov/2005publications/CEC-500-2005-070/CEC-500-2005-070.PDF;
DORA
YEN-NAKAFUJI, CALIFORNIA WIND RESOURCES (2005), available at http://www.energy.ca.gov/
2005publications/CEC-500-2005-071/CEC-500-2005-071-D.PDF.
Because all variables are

continuous, analysis was done by ordinary least squares linear regression using Stata, with
the robust HC3 command.
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Table 5: California State Senate Votes on Major Climate and
Energy Bills Enacted Since 2002
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Table 6: California State Assembly Votes on Major Climate and
Energy Bills Enacted Since 2002
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Unpacking the Force of Law
Kristin E. Hickman

66 Vand. L. Rev. 465 (2013)

In 2011, in Mayo Foundation for Medical Education and
Research v. United States, the Supreme Court held that
general authority Treasury regulations adopted using noticeand-comment rulemaking carry the force of law and thus are
eligible for Chevron deference. In the wake of Mayo, courts and
scholars are now struggling with its implications for whether
temporary Treasury regulations and IRB guidance documents
(revenue rulings, revenue procedures, and notices) that lack
notice and comment but are enforceable through civil penalties
are likewise eligible for Chevron deference and, relatedly,
whether these formats are in fact subject to APA notice-andcomment rulemaking requirements. Currently prevailing
judicial tests for evaluating these questions do not offer clear
or easy answers for the tax context. Ultimately, both questions
turn on whether the agency actions in question carry "the force
of law." The purpose of this Article is to take a step back from
existing doctrinal standards and to sort through the basic
administrative law principles and Supreme Court precedents
that drive those standards in an effort to develop a coherent
approach to Treasury and IRS rulemaking and judicial review
thereof.

